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PRECONDEMNATION ACTIVITIES -
CHALLENGING NEED IN CALIFORNIA
I. INTRODUCTION
Eminent Domain is the power federal, state, and local
governments have to purchase private property for public
use.' Governments exercise this power to buy property for
public projects such as flood control, expansion of roads and
highways, mass transportation, parks, recreation facilities, and
low and moderate income housing.' The power of eminent
domain is an inherent power,3 restricted by both federal and
state constitutional requirements of due process and just
compensation.4  Since governments can purchase private
property without the owner's consent,5 the governing bodies
© 1990 by Brenda K. Ross
1. J. SAcKmAN, NicHoLs ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.11, at 1-7 (rev. 3d ed.
1985 & Supp. 1990) (eminent domain is a power that can be exercised to pur-
chase private property for public projects, without an owner's consent); U.S.
CONST. amend. V, XIV (provides that property will not be taken without payment
of just compensation).
2. See infra notes 33-36.
3. See Comment, infra note 5, at 490 n.9-10 (citing Georgia v. Chattanooga,
264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924); People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N.Y. 225, 236-38, 54
N.E. 689, 692 (1899)); 1 J. SACKAN, NICIOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.12[l], at
1-14 (rev. 3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990) (for a discussion of the evolution of emi-
nent domain as an inherent power and political necessity of a civilized state).
4. The power of eminent domain is limited by the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution and extended to states under the 14th amendment. The
limits to the exercise of this power provided in the Constitution are due process
and payment of just compensation. See U.S. Const. amend. V ("nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation"); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."). The government must provide for due process
through a judicial forum in which the property owner can appear and be heard.
See I J. SACKMAN, supra note 1, § 1.1, at 1-7 (rev. 3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990)
(issues of whether or not the public needs the property and whether or not the
amount of just compensation is fair and equitable can be raised and tried by the
court). California adds to these limitations in its Constitution. See CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 19 (providing that property can tot he taken or damaged unless just compen-
sation has been paid to the owner or deposited in the court. The owner is enti-
tled to have the amount of just compensation determined by a jury and the
money promptly released in exchange for possession).
5. 1 J. SACKMAN, supra note 1, § 1.11, at 1-7 (rcv. 3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990);
Comment, Statutoiy Restrictions on the Exercise of Eminent Domain in Wisconsin: Dual
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are required to make certain determinations about project
benefit and need before the condemnation proceedings will
be given validity by courts.' These conditions precedent are
set out in federal and state statutes. 7 The statutes are de-
signed to give property owners the opportunity to be heard
on government need and location of a public project, and to
encourage acquiring agencies and property owners to reach a
settlement on the amount of just compensation that the own-
ers will receive.8
Requirements of Prior Negotiation and Provision of Negotiating Material, 63 MARQ. L.
REV. 489, 490 n.6 (1980) (authored by Ross F. Plaetzer) (citing United States v.
Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1883); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406
(1878)).
6. J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 24.12, at 24-179 (rev. 3d
ed. 1985 & Supp. 1990) (citing California cases Northwestern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 454, 211 P.2d 571 (1949); Housing Authority of
Oakland v. Forbes, 51 Cal. App. 2d 1, 124 P.2d 194 (1942)). The process by
which eminent domain power is exercised is generally referred to as "condemna-
tion" or "condemnation proceedings".
7. See generaUy CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1240.030, .040, .610, .650, 1245.210, .220, .230, .235, .250, .255, .260,
.270, 1250.360, .370, 1255.410 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990) (statutes governing
and defining the required precondemnation activities and requirements for con-
demnation action). Compare Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act, Pub. L No. 91-646, 84 Stat. 1894-1904 (1971) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4651 (1982 & Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Uniform
Act] (federal requirements; section 4651, subchapter III, of the Uniform Act,
entitled "Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy" governs acquisitions using
federal funds for public projects). Precondelnnation activities include: I) environ-
mental assessment; 2) the opportunity for the property owners to meet with an
independent appraiser to discuss their land during the property inspection and
the resulting preparation of an approved appraisal report indicating fair market
value of the property needed; 3) an offer made to the property owner based on
the appraisal, together with a summary of the basis for and the amount estab-
lished as just compensation; 4) a public hearing giving the property owner notice
and an opportunity to be heard on the proposed need of the property and the
location of the project through notice of intent to pass; 5) passing of resolution
of necessity in California; 6) opportunity to challenge the need and use of the
project, jurisdictional boundaries of the governing body condemning, abuse of dis-
cretion in adopting resolution of necessity, use of bribery once condemnation ac-
tion filed; 7) deposit of appraised amount of just compensation in exchange for
possession of the property pending final determination of just compensation; 8)
expiration of 30 days from the granting of possession; 9) withdrawal of deposited
amounts by the property owner.
8. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990) (pro-
vides that governing body notify property owners and give each a reasonable
opportunity to be heard on need and location as provided by section 1240.030).
This hearing is usually held in conjunction with the resolution of necessity. See
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982).
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In California, these statutes require the governing body
to make a formal statement of need, referred to as a reso-
lution of necessity, before instituting an action in court (con-
demnation proceedings) to exercise the power of eminent
domain.9 Prior to passing the resolution of necessity, notice
and an opportunity to be heard is provided to the property
owner.'0 To adopt the resolution of necessity, the govern-
ment board must engage in a good faith consideration of the
benefit and the impact of acquiring the land for the pro-
posed public project. The governing board must consider
whether 1) the project is necessary for the public, 2) the
property is necessary for the project, 3) the proposed project
is planned or located in the manner that will be most com-
patible with the greatest public good, and 4) the project is
planned or located in a manner that will cause the least pri-
vate injury (these considerations are hereinafter referred to
as "greatest public benefit and least private injury")." The
resolution of necessity requirement insures that a considered
decision is made by a board empowered by statute to autho-
rize acquisition, and that the property owner has an opportu-
nity for a formal hearing before the property is acquired
through the court in condemnation proceedings.'
2
The resolution of necessity procedure was added in
1982, to better balance and protect private and public inter-
ests. Prior to 1982, California Government Code section
7267.2 was the same as the Uniform Eminent Domain Code
("Uniform Code"). These codes provided that appraisals of
property and offers to purchase based on the appraisal must
be made to the owner before initiating negotiations. Section
9. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.040, 1245.220 (West 1982 & Supp. I
1990).
10. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1245.235 (1982 & Supp. 1 1900).
11. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.030, .040, 1245.210, .220, .235, .240 (West
1982 & Supp. I 1990); Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Slauson, 173
Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).
12. 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at 1001, 1026 (1976) (the Com-
mission recommended that all acquiring agencies be required to adopt a resolu-
tion of necessity to acquire property by eminent domain. They reasoned that "[i]n
addition to informing the property owner of the authority for the proposed
acquisition, it helps to insure that the public entity makes a considered decision
of both the need for the property as well as the proposed project itself."); Report
of Senate Committee on Judiciary, 75 S.J. 6537 (1975); Report of Assembly Com-
mittee on Judiciary, 75 A.J. 5181 (1975).
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7267.2 and the Uniform Code mirrored the acquisition laws
prescribed by the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisitions Policies Act (the "Uniform
Act"). 13
In 1982, the California Legislature changed Section
7267.2. The revision added the resolution of necessity re-
quirement to 7267.2, providing that appraisals and offers
must be made before the resolution of necessity can be
adopted by the governing body. 4 This revision supplements
the 1975 addition to section 1245.235, which requires the
governing body give property owners notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard. 5 Thus, the determination of greatest pub-
lic benefit and least private injury is made by the governing
body authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain at
13. In such states, where the federal Uniform Act has been adopted (adopted
in Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-1-101-121 (West 1990), intent to acquire can
be passed before appraisals and offers. Usually, the acquiring agency passes intents
to acquire and to condemn prior to the beginning of appraisals, offers, and
negotiations, at which time the property owner is given the opportunity to be
heard on need and location of the proposed project. The agency may determine
not to go ahead with the project after hearing the owner, but usually, the proper-
ty owner's input is used to improve the plans or shift the location of a roadway
to save trees, for example, preserve historically significant monuments, or facilitate
internal circulation problems. If the acquiring agency determines to go ahead with
the modified project after hearing the property owner, the property owner is then
given an opportunity to accompany an independent appraiser on a property in-
spection, appraisal reports are prepared, and offers made on the basis of the ap-
praisal report. Time is given for acceptance of the initial offer, and final offers
are made after a reasonable negotiation period. Condemnation will be commenced
with the court if the good faith negotiations fail. The property owner is assured
the protection of the court in the event of failure of negotiations; the court and
jury determine the amount to be paid to the owner. The agency will be able to
obtain immediate possession of the property upon request to the court at a
hearing where the property owner can again challenge the need and location of
the project, abuse of discretion of the acquiring agency, jurisdictional matters,
bribery, and adequacy of negotiations, if the property owner can show that reason-
able efforts to acquire by negotiations were not undertaken as required by section
4651(1) of the Uniform Act. If the court finds immediate possession appropriate,
the acquiring agency will be able to begin construction of the improvements on
the property pending determination of the final amount of just compensation to
be paid. The acquiring agency must deposit the amount of the offer with the
court in exchange for immediate possession, which amount will be released to the
property owner. No 30 day lapse time is required as it is in California. By this
time, the property owner has had several months to prepare for the acquisition.
Immediate possession is granted in cases where owners must be relocated but
only after a 90-day waiting period.
14. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267.2 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
15. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1245.235 (West 1082 & Supp. I 1990).
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a hearing held after appraisals and offers to purchase are
presented for acceptance to the property owners. The hear-
ing provided by 1245.235 and the determination of benefit
and injury can be held before adoption of the resolution of
necessity.'6 However, acquiring agencies usually do not hold
a hearing unless a resolution of necessity is requested.'7 A
resolution of necessity is only requested if negotiations fail,
the offer is rejected, and the matter must be decided by the
courts.' 8
Therefore, the 1982 revision had an impact on property
owners and governing bodies acquiring land for public pro-
jects. Overall, California statutes, do not require the acquir-
ing agency to pass the resolution of necessity unless they
intend to file a condemnation action in court to acquire the
property.'9 If the property owner accepts the offer to pur-
16. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235(d) (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
17. See STATE OF CALIFORNIA, BUSINESS TRANSPORTATION AND HOUSING AGEN-
CY, DEPARTMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY PROCEDURAL MANUAL, ISSUED BY DIVISION OF
RIGHT OF WAY, VOL. 4A - ACQUISITION § 450.006 at 3 (1st ed. 1982, rev. 1989)
[hereinafter ACQUISITION PROCEDURAL MANUAL) (nothing in the statutes require
that the opportunity to be heard must be provided at the same time as the
resolution of necessity is passed, but agencies like the California Transportation
and Housing Agency, read these requirements together; the hearing required prior
to passing the resolution of necessity is. only held after the appraisals and the
offers to purchase are made, and only if and when the offer is refused and the
agency must file a condemnation action with the court, to acquire possession of
the property and request the amount of just compensation be determined). Other
hearings are held, such as during the environmental assessment process, but
public notice is published in the newspaper, individual owners are not sent per-
sonal notice. The agency could send personal notice and combine this hearing
with .environmental assessment hearings addressing public benefit and least injury.
Then if a resolution of necessity is requested, the agency has already complied
with the hearing requirement.
18. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.230 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990); ACQUISI-
TION PROCEDURAL MANUAL, supra note 17 (this is not to say that the staff of
acquiring agencies never consider public benefit and least private injury in select-
ing projects and identifying property needed. However, the location may be
chosen for reasons other than greatest public benefit and least private injury. For
example, the location for the alignment of a highway widening project may be
chosen so that it is easier to construct. Perhaps a new lane will be added to the
outside on each side of the existing road, which would enable the agency to build
the new improvement without moving the median in the middle. Least private
injury may not be a consideration. No formal hearing is held before the board
authorized to adopt the resolution of necessity where the private owner has an
opportunity to appear and be heard if he accepts the agencies' offer to purchase).
19. Cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.040, 1245.220 (West 1982) (these are
the code section that require a resolution of necessity; the resolution is only re-
quired if the agency indends to file a condemnation action in court).
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chase, the governing body authorized to exercise the power
of eminent domain is not required to determine greatest
public benefit and least private injury by adopting the reso-
lution of necessity. Therefore, the determination by the au-
thorized board is required only if the property owner rejects
the offer to purchase. The result, analyzed in this comment,
may be that the project is so advanced by the time the hear-
ing can be conducted that the governing board virtually has
no discretion to make a determination of greatest public
benefit and least private injury."
This limit on discretion is most significant when a num-
ber of properties are purchased for a public improvement,
and one of the properties has a unique problem which is not
apparent until the owner has an opportunity to be heard at
a formal hearing. For example, many businesses are designed
to function on a specific site, such as a warehouse with a
loading dock area developed to serve delivery trucks. If a
portion of the delivery area is acquired by the governing
body to widen a street, the delivery trucks may not be able
to "turn around" off of the street, as required by the city.
The acquisition would make the site dysfunctional to the
owner, but the problem may not be apparent until the own-
er is provided an opportunity to be heard.
As all owners receive appraisals and offers to purchase
20. See Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d
1121, 1129, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365, 370 (1985) (held the authorizing board removed
its discretion, prior to the hearing held in conjunction with the resolution of
necessity, by entering into a contract with a developer which incorporated
Slauson's property, and issuing bonds to finance the redevelopment; the hearing
and passing of the resolution, became a rubber stamp process, by virtue of prior
actions which committed the agency irrevocably to take the property regardless of
any evidence that might be presented at the hearing. The court dismissed the
condemnation action). Compare San Bernadino County Flood Control Dist. v.
Grabowski, 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1988) (district did not bind
itself to other commitments which removed its discretion, and presented at trial
evidence to substantiate the considerations of greatest public benefit and least
private injury); Anaheim Redevelopment Agency v. Dusek, 193 Cal. App. 3d 249,
239 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987) (the court held the agency considered the pros and
cons prior to passing the resolution of necessity); Huntington Park Redevelopment
Agency v. Duncan, 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1983), cert. denied,
646 U.S. 895 (1983) (the court held the Duncans were not attacking the resolu-
tion of necessity, but were attacking the agency's decision to select one of two
competing plans for the redevelopment of the property. The court found no
abuse of discretion as the pros and cons were considered' prior to adopting the
resolution of necessity).
216 [Vol. 31
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prior to the hearing, the offers on adjoining properties may
be accepted by owners who do not share the unique prob-
lem. In the warehouse example, the purchase of these adjoin-
ing properties may fix the alignment of the road so that the
widening cannot be shifted to cause the least private harm.
However, a large sum of money already has been expended
on the acquisition before the determination of least private
injury can be made. Thus, the governing board's determina-
tion at a later formal hearing of greatest public benefit and
least private injury is altered by the events that occur prior
to the time the hearing is required by statute.2' This hypo-
thetical is used in the analysis section of the comment to dis-
cuss the acquiring agency's and the property owners' options
before and after the hearing and resolution of necessity.
First, the comment analyzes the result of the 1982
amendment to California Government Code section
7267.221 which provided for a resolution of necessity (the
formal statement of a benefit/injury determination) after
appraisals and offers. The comment also discusses the effect
of the 1975 revision to section 1255.420 providing for an
automatic 30 day lag time following every order for posses-
21sion. Within this framework, the comment then examines
whether or not the legislative intent has been achieved, or if
the people of California are suffering from unanticipated
side-effects, such as slowed delivery of needed public facili-
ties, increased project costs, loss of board discretion to weigh
public benefit and private injury at a formal hearing, less
protection for property owners, disincentives to reach agree-
ment and settle acquisition matters, and loss of confidence in
public programs.2 4
Second, the comment examines California's present law
21. See generUlly Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985)
(entering into prior contract with developer resulted in a loss of discretion in a
determination of least private injury).
. 22. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267.2 (West 1982). Compaw 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1982
& Supp. 1989).
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.420 (West 1982) (30 days is automatically
given property owners to request a stay of the order of possession of property
under substantial hardship claims, whether or not a meritorious claim exists); CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.410 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990) (order for possession).
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982) (sets forth legislative intent to
.encourage and expedite acquisition by agreement . . . assure consistent treat-
ment . . . and promote public confidence . . ").
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governing the exercise of the power of eminent domain from
a procedural standpoint.25 This comment can be utilized as
a checklist to determine if, under current law, all of the pro-
cedures have been followed during precondemnation activi-
ties, up to and through the request to the court for posses-
sion of the property prior to the final determination of just
compensation. The comment also discusses the basis on
which property owners can procedurally challenge acquisi-
tion.2" California procedures will be compared generally to
25. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1240.030, .040, .610, .650, 1245.210, .220, .230, .235, .250, .255, .260,
.270, 1250.360, .370, 1255.410 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990) (California requires
that appraisals of property and offers of purchase be made to the property owner
before the acquiring agency passes its resolution of necessity. The resolution of
necessity states the need for the property and describes it. Notice is sent to the
property owner that the resolution of necessity is going to be passed, and pro-
vides them with an opportunity to be heard on the question of need and location
of the project (least private impact balanced with greatest public benefit). If the
property owner requests a hearing, the right to be heard is preserved. If the
owner does not respond to the notice that the resolution of necessity is going to
be passed, the right to challenge need and location at a hearing is waived. (A
valid resolution precludes judicial review of need and location, but not a challenge
on the basis of public use, or that the condemnor does not intend to use the
property for the declared purpose, abuse of discretion, bribery, jurisdiction, and in
some circumstances the adequacy of negotiations where the owner can clearly
show that every reasonable and diligent effort to acquire property was not taken
as required by section 7267.1(a)). The hearing can be held and resolution of
necessity passed at separate times, but generally the hearing is not held and the
resolution of necessity is not passed unless negotiations to purchase the property
fail, and the court will be asked to determine the amount of just compensation to
be paid. If negotiations fail, and a resolution of necessity is passed, condemnation
proceedings can be commenced). See ACQUISITION PROCEDUAL MANUAL, supra note
17; compare Uniform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
26. The courts will only review the resolution of necessity on the basis of
gross abuse of discretion, evidence of bribery, or lack of jurisdiction of the con-
demning agency to acquire property outside of its boundaries or oil the validity
of a resolution of necessity. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1250.360 (West 1982 &
Supp. I 1990) (judicial review after condemnation filed, grounds for objecting to
right to take regardless of whether a resolution of necessity has been adopted);
San Bernadino County Flood Control Dist. v. Grabowski, 205 Cal. App. 3d 885,
252 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1988) (discusses 1250.370); CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 1250.370
(West 1982 & Supp. I 1990) (if a resolution of necessity that has conclusive effect
has not been passed); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.255 (West 1982) (attack on
validity by writ of mandate, requesting dismissal of the eminent domain proceed-
ing, but only on the grounds of abuse of discretion based on arbitrary, capricious
or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, "and whether the governing body has
failed to follow the procedures and given the notice required by law;" the 1975
and 1978 Comment following the statute notes that the validity of the resolution
may be subject to direct attack by administrative mandamus (CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 1085 (West 1990)). Anaheim Redevelopment Agency v. Dusek, 193 Cal.
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the Uniform Code and the federal Uniform Act.
Finally, this comment proposes the revisions to sections
7267.2 in 1982 and to 1255.420 in 1975 be repealed. The re-
sult will be to eliminate the effect of the requirement of
appraisals and offers prior to adopting the resolution of
necessity, and reduce the acquisition time required to begin
construction of needed public projects. 27 This comment con-
App. 3d 249, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987) (clarifies an interpretation made by the
Legislative Comment; mandate is filed under 1085); or by request of declaratory
relief and injunction due to conflict of interest attack under the Political Reform
Act of 1974, (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 91003(b) (West 1982)); Grabowsk4 205 Cal. App.
3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1988) (objection to right to take which is not raised
until after eminent domain procedure filed, and raised under the Political Reform
Act of 1974, a conflict of interest challenge, must be asserted by way of a com-
pulsory cross-complaint filed separately by objecting party, not asserted by answer
filed in eminent domain action); Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Superior Court (Hayfork
Valley Public Utility Dist.), 180 Cal. App. 3d 770, 225 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1986) (even
though the resolution of necessity did not comply with the eminent domain law
requirements, the Court allowed the (public utility) acquiring agency to correct the
deficiency and file an amended complaint in the eminent domain action).
27. By repealing these revisions, sections 7267.2 and 1255.420 will again con-
form to the Uniform Code and the Uniform Act. The 1982 and 1975 revisions
made the California statutes differ from the Uniform Code and federal Uniform
Act in an important area. California requires that appraisals of property and offers
of purchase be made to the property owner before the agency passes its resolu-
tion of necessity (formal statement of need and greatest public benefit and least
private injury). It is more difficult for the property owner to affect the location of
the project and the necessity for the land being acquired at this time in the
process. The project is often too advanced to change plans which would have
resulted in less impact in the early stages. Usually many parcels of land have
already been purchased and alignment fixed. Even if the governing body hears
valid arguments from the property owner, a great deal of cost has already been
incurred and other property owners irreversibly impacted. The federal Uniform
Act does not require appraisals and offers be made before the resolution of
necessity is passed. Under the Uniform Code and Act, the condemning agencies
pass intents to acquire and condemn prior to the beginning of negotiations and
offers. This type of resolution states the agencies' intent to acquire through good
faith negotiations (appraisals and offers) and intent to protect the property
owner's right to have a court determine the amount of just compensation by
filing a condemnation action with the court if good faith negotiations fail. Further,
in California, the resolution of necessity is not passed unless the negotiations have
failed, and the court will be asked to determine the amount of just compensation
to be paid. Therefore, not all property owners get a chance to appear. Under the
federal Uniform Act, all owners are given an opportunity to be heard, even those
who reach agreement with the acquiring agency. Further, all parcels of property
needed for the entire project can be taken to the authorizing agency board for
intents to acquire and condemn at one time; the board gets coordinated input. In
California, the acquiring agency must return to the authorizing board each time a
negotiation fails. (The Public Works Board and the Transportation Commission
are the primary boards that have authority to pass resolutions of necessity for
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cludes 1) that the requirement that appraisals and offers to
purchase be made before the resolution of necessity can be
passed, is misplaced, and should be deleted from California
Government Code section 7267.2,28 2) that the governing
board's determination of greatest public benefit and least
private injury should be required earlier in the final design
phase before appraisals and offers to purchase, and 3) that
until these changes are implemented, acquiring agencies
should separate the hearing on greatest public benefit and
least private injury from the adoption of the resolution of
necessity, and give all property owners an opportunity to
appear and be heard earlier in the process, such as during
final design, and 4) that the automatic 30-day lag time pro-
vided by 1255.420 be revised to allow for special requests
due to hardship at the ex parte hearing when the order is
granted. 29 Absent a hardship request, acquiring agencies
should get immediate possession of property upon deposit of
the amount of just compensation with the court. The owner
would have the ability to withdraw the deposit before final
determination of the amount.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Public Entity Power to Condemn Under Eminent Domain
The revisions are analyzed against the background of
history. Courts have long recognized eminent domain as an
inherent power necessary to the advancement of society,
which advancement is sometimes superior to private inter-
public facilities projects, and most acquiring agencies must look to them for
resolutions. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1245.210 (West 1982)). If the agency
holds the hearing while design of the project is underway, less time is required
between the time the owner rejects the offer to purchase and the amount of just
compensation is determined and paid through the court; possession of the proper-
ty can be acquired for a speedier completion of the project. In California, it
currently takes state agencies a minimum of two years to acquire possession of
private property for needed public projects, compared to six months required for
acquisition under federal statutes. See generally UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE
(Official Text with Comments, West 1974); 42 U.S.C. § 4251 (1982 & Supp. 1989)
(Uniform Act); compare ACQUISITION PROCEDURAL MANUAL, supra note 17; STATE
OF CALIFORNIA, BUSINESS TRANSPORTATION AND HOUSING AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF
RIGHT OF WAY POLICY MANUAL, VOL. 4A, Ch.1 at 01-105-01 (1st ed. 1983, rev.
8-89) [hereinafter POLICY MANUAL].
28. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 7267.2 (West 1982 Supp. I 1990).
29. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.420 (West 1982).
220 [Vol. 31
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ests. 0 Government power of eminent domain is inherent in
the United States Constitution. The power is limited by the
fifth amendment provision that private property can not be
taken for public use without payment of just compensation.
The power of eminent domain is extended to the states
through the fourteenth amendment which also requires due
process of law. The California Constitution provides that the
property owner is entitled to have a jury determine the
amount of just compensation and further, that this just com-
pensation must be released in exchange for possession of
property needed for public improvements.8 ' Further, Cali-
fornia statutes provide that the power of eminent domain
may be exercised to acquire private property for public
use.3
2
State agencies including the Department of Parks and
Recreation, the Department of Water Resources, and the
Department of Fish and Game are authorized by statute to
exercise the power of eminent domain."3 School districts
and public utilities also possess condemnation authority.3 4
Special districts have general authority to condemn by virtue
of enabling statutes."5 Cities and counties also have broad
power to condemn to carry out government functions. 6
30. See supra note 3.
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ([Njor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.");
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (just compensation shall be determined by a jury and
released in exchange for possession upon deposit in the court; land can be ac-
quired for public improvements upon payment of just compensation).
32. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.010 (West 1982).
33. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 8590, 8593-8595 (West 1982) (Department of Water
Resources); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1348-1349 (West 1982) (Department of
Fish and Game). See, e.g., CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 437 (West 1982) (Adjutant
General); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 14661-14662 (West 1982) (Department of General
Services); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6808 (West 1982) (State Lands Commission);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54093 (West 1982); CAL. PUB.. RES. CODE §§ 5006, 5006.2
(West 1982) (Department of Parks and Recreation); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15854
(West 1982) (Public Works Board); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 8590, 8593-8595 (West
1982) (Reclamation Board).
34. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1047 (West 1982) (school districts); CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE §§ 21633, 21652 (West 1982) (public utilities).
35. CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE §§ 5900.4, 6076, 6296 (West 1982) (harbor im-
provement districts, port districts); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 12703, 16404, 28953
(West 1982) (municipal utility districts, public utility districts, San Francisco Bay
Area Rapid Transit Districts).
36. CAL. GoV'T CODE § 38010 (West 1982).
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These authorizing statutes provide that the entity may
exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property
necessary for any purpose or function, which is equated with
recognized public uses. Well-established public uses for which
property can be acquired include highways, streets, electric
transmission lines, water lines, parks, recreation facilities, and
the elimination of slums and blight. 7 However, public use
is broadly defined as any use that promotes the general in-
terest of a community or any legitimate object of govern-
ment, whether or not the whole community directly or indi-
rectly enjoys or participates in the improvement.38
B. Balance of Government Power and Private Interests
1. The Public Rights Doctrine at the Heart of the Police
Power of Eminent Domain
The public rights doctrine 9 provides that private prop-
erty owned by individuals is held on the condition that prop-
erty will not be used to injure the equal rights of others.
Property must be used in such a way that the rights and
interests of individuals and the community as a collective
public are not greatly impaired.4"
This doctrine is advanced under the notion that the
community as a whole has rights that are sometimes superior
to the rights of the individual.4  For example, the
community's need for transportation systems are viewed as
greater than the individual's need to retain private ownership
of the land. The community's rights are exercised to meet
the need for a street (which would cross over a series of
private parcels of land) to access grocery stores, work places,
37. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.010 (West 1982) (the Law Revision
Commission Comment that follows provides background on recognized public
use); Note, Anticipating an Instant Replay: City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 17
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 963 (1984) (for a discussion of public use); City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1982); San Bernadino County
Flood Control Dist. v. Grabowski, 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676
(1988).
38. Grabowski, 205 Cal. App. 3d 885.
39. See Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History,
72 CALIF. L. REv. 217, 221 (1984) (for an excellent discussion of the public rights
doctrine).
40. Id. at 224.
41. Id.
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and schools. Without the power of eminent domain, the
government would not be able to link the street from homes
to stores, offices, and schools, unless all property owners
agreed at the same time to sell their land. If the public right
is not held superior to that of the individual, a single proper-
ty owner could prevent the road from being built, denying
the community access.4"
Commentators suggest that public rights in the United
States date back to at least the middle of the 19th century.
Public rights were judicially recognized in the 1848 eminent
domain case of West River Bridge Co. v. Dix. The Court
held that the government not only has the right but the duty
to promote the interest of the community by purchasing
private property for public purposes."
Against this background, private property owners sought
protection from government greed. State governments were
competing with each other to attract industrial develop-
ment.45 The power of eminent domain was often exercised
to build new transportation systems designed to move
ever-increasing numbers of automobiles from the home to
stores and work places. 6 The perception that the govern-
ment operated as an entity with interests separate from those
of the community became pervasive as new trends de-
veloped.47
The trends reflected attitudes about people's relationship
with government. Government came to be seen as a
"deep-pocket" source of money. 8 People developed ideas
42. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
43. See Scheiber, supra note 39, at 225 (citing West River Bridge Co. v. Dix,
47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848)).
44. This comment will not analyze the concept of the power of eminent do-
main generally. Its scope is limited to an analysis of the statutory provisions for
its exercise in public facilities projects, using transportation needs as its primary
example. See Scheiber, supra note 39; 1 J. SACHMAN, supia note 1, § 1.12[1], at
1-12, § 1.14, at 1-21 to 1-34; Bennett, Eminent Domain and Redevelopment: The Re-
turn of Engine Charlie, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 115, 116-22 (1981); Grant, The "Higher
Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 WiS. L. REV. 67 (1937) (for a full
discussion of the development of the power of eminent domain).
45. See Scheiber, supra note 39, at 218.
46. Roberts, Homes, Roadbuilders and the Courts: Highway Relocation and Judicial
Review of Administrative Action, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 75 (1972).
47. Bennett, supra note 44.
48. Bennett, supra note 44.
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that they should get as much as possible from the govern-
ment for their property. To obtain the highest compensation,
people adopted hold-out tactics refusing to sell as long as
possible.4" Most people did not make the connection be-
tween individuals as taxpayers and the tax-dollar that paid for
these purchases.5" In response to public pressure, the legis-
lature passed more laws to bridle the ability of government
to purchase property for public purposes.5 The new legisla-
tion included the 1982 revision to section 7267.2 (adding the
resolution of necessity after appraisals and offers) and the
1975 revision to section 1255.420 (providing for an automatic
30 days after an order for possession).52 However, revisions
were made without the benefit of hindsight to evaluate the
effect.55
2. Externality Costs Associated with the "Deep-Pocket" Atti-
tude
Revisions such as those to sections 7267 and 1255.420
were intended to give private owners more voice in balancing
the public interest and private rights.54 As the goal of com-
pensating the property owner is given more emphasis, social
costs (externality costs) appear.5 5  Private rights are ex-
49. Bennett, supra note 44.
50. Bennett, supra note 44.
51. 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at 1001 (1976) (background and
recommendations for revision of California's eminent domain laws).
52. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.420 (West 1982); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
7267.2 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990); 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at
1001, 1026 (1976); Report of Senate Committee on Judiciary, 75 S.J. 6537 (1975);
Report of Assembly Committee on Judiciary, 75 A.J. 5181 (1975).
53. CAL. COV'T CODE § 7267.2 (West 1982) (adding the requirement that the
resolution of necessity can only be passed after appraisals and offers to purchase
have been made is a good example).
54. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.420
(West 1982); 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at 1001 (1976); Report of
Senate Committee on Judiciary, 75 S.J. 6537 (1975); Report of Assembly Commit-
tee on Judiciary, 75 A.J. 5181 (1975).
55. Externality costs is a general concept associated with property whereby
society bears the burden of extra costs if the property owner receives more than
their land is worth. Externalities exist if a person makes a decision about how to
use a resource (in the case of land acquisition, the resource is land and money
available for the purchase of private property that is needed for public projects)
without considering the full .cost or benefit that would result as the burden falls
on others, or is "external" to the decision maker. In the case of land acquisition
for public projects, if the owner is paid fair market value in balance with commu-
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changed for just compensation when property is needed for
public projects, and if the property owner is paid more for
the property than it would bring on the open market ("fair
market value"),56 the extra cost is external to the property
owner. Society bears the burden of the extra cost. Converse-
ly, when the property owner's self-interest is minimized, the
costs correspond to minimized social costs. Externality costs
then shift onto the property owner. Therefore, if the proper-
ty owner and the government balance the best interest of the
community with the individual's self-interest, perfect compen-
sation is reached. 57 The owner is paid fair market value and
the community benefits from the land acquired for the nec-
essary public purpose.
In response, legislative revisions attempted to balance
costs and benefits. The Legislature hoped the parties directly
involved could balance self-interest with community inter-
est.5 The Legislature wanted private owners and acquiring
agencies to agree on the amount the owners should be paid
in exchange for their land, thus relieving court congestion.
Moreover, the Legislature reasoned that if land owners and
government agencies reached agreements among themselves,
without court assistance, public confidence in land acquisition
practices would be built, and more consistent treatment
could be achieved in public programs. California's Legislature
revised the eminent domain law hoping to provide for proce-
dures that achieved these goals.59 The state revised the emi-
nent domain laws by adopting portions of the Uniform Emi-
nity benefit from the land acquired, then perfect compensation is reached. See
generally Cooter, Unity in Tort Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1985).
56. 6 J. SACKMAN, supra note 6, § 18-IA-172, at 14-33 (rev. 3d ed. 1989) (fair
market value defined as "the price the property would bring when offered for sale
by a willing seller who is not forced to sell and which is sought by a willing
buyer who is not required to buy").
57. Id.
58. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982).
59. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982) providing-
In order to encourage and expedite the acquisition of real property
by agreement with owners, to avoid litigation and relieve congestion
in the courts, to assure consistent treatment for owners in the public
programs, and to promote public confidence in public land acquisi-
tion practices, public entitles shall to the greatest extent practicable be
guided by the provisions of sections 7267.1 to 7267.7 ...
Compare Uniform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
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nent Domain Code (the Uniform Code).
The Uniform Code was drafted collectively among a
number of states at the National Conference of the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws.6" Notable efforts were pur-
sued in California as well as in Florida, Maryland, New York,
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Virginia to prepare the
code.6 The Uniform Code was drafted in response to wide
concern that the lack of uniformity among state eminent
domain statutes fostered injustice." Within each state there
were different forms of condemnation procedure depending
on the identity of the condemnor or the purpose of the
acquisition or project. The concern was further prompted by
the millions of dollars that were being spent to acquire thou-
sands of parcels of land for public improvement programs
like the federal interstate highway program and local urban
renewal projects. 63
The Uniform Code was also adopted by the United
States Congress. The Code significantly mirrors portions of
the Uniform Act.64 Subchapter III (of the Uniform Act) pro-
vides for a uniform process for acquisition of property that
is to be followed by any governmental agency using federal
funds for any portion of the project.65 The Uniform Act
also provides for a process to ensure assistance to property
owners and tenants who are required to move off of the
land that is needed for the public improvement. This portion
of the Act was used extensively by governmental redevelop-
ment agencies when slums were torn down and new housing
and businesses were built. Subchapter I provides that the
acquiring agency must find safe, decent, sanitary housing for
people displaced by a project. Subchapter I further provides
60. UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE (Official Text with Comments, West
1974). See 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at 1001, 1026 (1976).
61. UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE (official Text with Comments, West
1974).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
65. Columbia v. Costle, 710 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1983) (state must comply
with section 4651 to greatest extent possible under state law, even if such compli-
ance may be "uneconomical . . . [c]ity must comply with federal real property
acquisition procedures (42 U.S.C. §§ 4651, 4655) in connection with EPA construe-
tion grant for sewer line to waste water facility . . . ."); 7 J. SACMAN, NICHOLS
ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.03, at 6-7 (rev. 3d ed. 1989).
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for payment of relocation expenses and financing for in-
creased rents and mortgage amounts that might have to be
paid in the comparable home.66
The Uniform Code and subchapter III of the Uniform
Act provide that the acquiring agency cannot begin a con-
demnation action until a resolution stating public need and
proposed use is adopted. 67 This resolution corresponds to
the resolution of necessity required in California. Initially,
California Government Code section 7267.2 contained the
same language as section 4651 of the Uniform Act.68 To
protect private interests, these provisions provided that the
acquiring agency prepare appraisals of the fair market value
and offer the owner the full amount of the appraisal before
the commencement of negotiations with the property owner.
In 1982, California deviated from the Uniform Act and Code
by adopting the revision to Government Code section 7267.2
requiring the appraisal and offer be made before the reso-
lution of necessity was passed.
To help insure that the acquiring agency make a consid-
ered decision of both the need for the property as well as
66. 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (1982 & Supp. 1989). (Tie relocation aspect of prop-
erty acquisition will not be discussed at length. This comment will concentrate on
the purchase aspect. It should be noted that most projects undertaken by govern-
mental agencies in the nature of infrastructure construction and reconstruction do
not require more than a few feet of a property owner's land, for example,
enough area to build a lane in a roadway widening project. Provisions which
relate to the relocation of people (that must vacate their land) require different
considerations due to the time needed to adjust to the relocation. Therefore, the
provisions of the Uniform Act and California's statutes covering relocation and
displaced persons are not subject to the same need for modification as acquisition
of property where people will not be asked to move.).
67. UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE (Official Text with Comments, West
1974); 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (1982 & Supp. 1989); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267.2 (West
1982 & Supp. 1 1990) (as well as Section 4651(3) of the Uniform Act) read:
Before the initiation of negotiations for real property, the public enti-
ty shall establish an amount which it believes to be just compensation
therefor, and shall make a prompt offer to acquire the property for
the full amount so established. In no event shall such amount be less
than the public entity's approved appraisal of the fair market value of
such property . . . . The public entity shall provide the owner of real
property to be acquired with a written statement of, and summary of
the basis for, the amount it established as just compensation.
Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990) ("before the
initiation of negotiations for real property . . . " changed in 1982 amendment to
read, "prior to adopting a resolution of necessity . . . ").
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for the proposed project itself, 9 public entities are required
to adopt resolutions of necessity pursuant to section
1245.230,70 after the hearing in which these determinations
are made, but before filing a condemnation proceeding as re-
quired by sections 1240.040 and 1245.220."' The resolution
must contain the governing body's declaration of the public
use for which the described property is needed, and a state-
ment that the governing body made a determination that the
project serves the greatest public good and causes the least
private injury to justify the taking.7" Under section
1245.2357s the property owner can appear and be heard on
section 1240.03074 matters. Section 1240.030 encouraged the
acquiring agencies to acquire only land needed when the
public interest and necessity require the proposed project.
Necessity is defined as "reasonably suited and useful to the
project" in this determination.75  Section 1245.23576 pro-
69. 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at 1001, 1026 (1976).
70. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.230 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
71. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.040, 1245.220 (West 1982).
72. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 1982) provides:
The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property
for a proposed project only if all of the following are established:
(a) The public interest and necessity require the project.
(b) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
(c) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.
See San Bernadino County Flood Control Dist. v. Crabowski, 205 Cal. App. 3d
885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1988); Anaheim Redevelopment Agency v. Dusek, 193
Cal. App. 3d 249, 252, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319, 320 (1987); luntington Park Redevel-
opment Agency v. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985);
Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Duncan, 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 24, 190
Cal. Rptr. 744, 748 (1983), cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 895 (1983).
73. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
74. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 1982); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1245.235(b) (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990) provides that notice will be sent by
first-class mail and state:
(1) The intent of the governing body to adopt the resolution.
(2) The right of such person to appear and be heard on the matters
referred to in Section 1240.030.
(3) Failure to file a written request to appear and be heard within 15
days after the notice was mailed will result in waiver of the right to
appear and be heard.
75. Necessary to the project is defined as "suitable and desirable for the con-
struction and use of the proposed public project. See City of Hawthorne v.
Peebles, 166 Cal. App. 2d 758, 763, 333 P.2d 442, 445 (1959) ("necessity does not
signify impossibility of constructing the improvement . ..without taking the land
in question, but merely requires that the land be reasonably suitable and useful
for the improvement.") See Rialto Irr. Dist. v. Brandon, 103 Cal. 384, 37 P. 484
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vides that the resolution of necessity can only be adopted af-
ter a notice and opportunity to be heard has been given to
the property owner.
In balancing whether the property serves the greatest
public need and causes the least private injury, governing
bodies look at factors such as economic costs, and physical
and geographic location. For example, the court in Hunting-
ton Park Redevelopment Agency v. Duncan, held that the gov-
erning body had weighed the public benefit against the pri-
vate injury by finding that the taking of Duncan's land for
development of an office building would enhance tax reve-
nues more than the alternative (proposed by Duncan) use of
the property. Additionally, the government project would
provide 35 new jobs and add $2 million to the area's gross
revenues, while the Duncan proposal would only create eight
new jobs and would not significantly increase gross
revenues. 77
Similarly, the court emphasized economic considerations
in Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Slauson, where it
stated the governing body must determine the value of the
parking lot being acquired and compare this amount to the
value of other property on the block. 78 Further, in San
Bernadino County Flood Control Dist. v. Grabowski the court
stated that implicit in arriving at the decision to take by
eminent domain, the governing body must weigh the pros
and cons of the 1240.030 requirements that the public in-
terest and necessity required the project, the project is
planned or located so as to achieve greatest public good and
least private injury, and the property is necessary for the
project. The district satisfied the requirements by considering
that Grabowski's site was the smallest and least expensive site
which would accommodate the project, and that the project
was needed for the public good. 79 Further, the land was the
(1894). Evidence on necessity would have to show that the land was not suitable
or desirable for the proposed project for the property owner to challenge on the
basis of need.
76. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
77. 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 24, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744, 749 (1983), cen. denied, 464
U.s. 895 (1983).
78. 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 1129, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365, 370 (1985).
79. 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 897, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676, 672 (1988).
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most topographically suitable and desirable as a location."0
Once the pros and cons are weighed and a 1240.030
determination is made (need, benefit and injury), the resolu-
tion of necessity can be passed."' The acquiring agency then
can file for condemnation of the property and request that
the court determine the amount of just compensation. The
resolution conclusively establishes the findings of 1240.030
(need, benefit and injury)., 2
Owners can challenge the conclusive effect of the resolu-
tion under 1245.2553 by claiming abuse of discretion. The
owner may request a writ of mandate before the action is
filed with the court. The court clarified this process in Mor-
gan Hill v. Alberti, stating that if the owner challenges the
resolution of necessity before the condemnation action is
filed with the court, judicial review may be obtained by peti-
tion for a writ of mandate pursuant to section 10854 or
the owner can challenge the government's determination to
acquire after the eminent domain action has been filed by
asserting a defense to the proceeding under section
1245.255.5
The court in Anaheim Redevelopment Agency v. Dusek 6
discussed writ of mandate under 1085 as a limited judicial
review where the court would not substitute its own judg-
ment regarding need and location, but rather would look at
the resolution of necessity proceedings to determine: 1) if
the governing body had been arbitrary, capricious or had
been acting without firm evidentiary support, 2) if the proce-
80. Id. at 899, 252 Cal. Rptr. 684
81. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 1982); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1250.370 (West 1982) (resolution of necessity can be adopted only after notice
and a hearing on 1240.030 matters).
82. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 1982); San Bernadino County
Flood Control Dist. v. Grabowski, 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676
(1988).
83. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.255 (West 1982); Grabowsk, 205 Cal. App.
3d 885.
84. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1980).
85. Morgan Hi4 211 Cal. App. 3d 1435, 260 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1989) (citing CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.255); Anaheim Redevelopment Agency v. Dusek, 193 Cal.
App. 3d 249, 258, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319, 324 (1987) (for a full discussion on the use
of the writ of mandate pursuant to section 1085); Huntington Park Redevelop-
ment Agency v. Duncan, 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 25-26, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744, 748
(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 895 (1983).
86. 193 Cal. App. 3d 249, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987).
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dures required by law were followed,87 and 3) if notice had
been given to the property owner. The standard of review
under a 1085 proceeding is whether or not there had been a
gross abuse of discretion. 8
The court in Slauson found a gross abuse of discretion
and rendered the agency's resolution of necessity invalid. The
agency failed to determine the value of the Slauson's parking
lot as opposed to other property on the block when weigh-
ing public benefit and least private injury. Moreover, the
87. The grounds do not include the ability to challenge the negotiation pro-
cess, or the appraisal, only the need and location. 6 J. SACKMAN, supra note 6, §
24.14[1], at 24-234 (rev. 3d ed. 1990) (however, commentators state "unless there
is a bona fide attempt . . . to induce the owner to sell the land at a reasonable
figure, the condition under which the power is granted is not fulfilled and ...
any attempted exercise of eminent domain is unauthorized and consequently void
and of no effect."). The requirement that prior negotiations be undertaken is a
prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the acquiring agency. However, the word itself is
not defined in any relevant section of the condemnation statutes. See Comment,
supra note 5 (the negotiation process is divided into three areas for challenging
the acquisition: I) the effort made by the condemnor to reach agreement with the
landowner; 2) the nature of the offer or offers made; and 3) the extent to which
negotiations must be carried out before a statutory condemnation proceeding may
be commenced. The effort must be in good faith, without duress, and with the
goal in mind of reaching voluntary agreement (rather than making a perfunctory
or formal offer only); principles of contract law have been carried over into this
area of condemnation proceedings. The offer must be more than perfunctory or
lack of effort and good faith will can be found). See Comment, supra note 5, at
498, (citing United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979);
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 408 (1878); United States v. 320.0 Acres of
Land, 605 F.2d 762, 781 (5th Cir. 1979) (the acquiring agency must be willing to
pay the market value and make an effort to purchase the property for the market
price); Comment, supra note 5, at 500) (the extent of negotiations is not governed
by the length or number of offers or counteroffers, but rather "whether the
quality of the negotiations is adequate and sufficient to show a good faith and
vigorous attempt to induce a voluntary and reasonable settlement." Parties are not
required to negotiate to an impasse, but rather until it has become "clear that
[the property owner] will not accept an offer which the condemnor deems reason-
able."); Comment, supra note 5, at 502-03, n.67 (the courts seem to look at
whether or not there was adequate communication with an intent that the com-
munication would lead to agreement among the parties). Adequate communication
is defined by the statutory procedures regarding offers and appraisals. If these
procedures are not met, the property owner may be able to challenge the quality,
adequacy, and sufficiency, thereby voiding the acquisition. The acquiring agency
would then have to start the entire acquisition procedure over again, meeting the
procedural requirements. If the procedures are met the first time, the owner may
be able to challenge the intent of the offers or communication as perfunctory or
formal rather than communication intended to lead to agreement between the
parties. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 7267.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
88. Dusek, 193 Cal. App. 3d 249, 255, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319, 322.
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court found the governing body's discretion had been re-
moved altogether by entering into irrevocable contracts with
developers and by issuing bonds to finance the develop-
ment.89 Conversely, in Grabowski90 and Duncan9 the court
found each property owner failed in their challenge of the
governing body's discretion.
The burden of proving the existence of gross abuse of
discretion shifts from the property owner to the governing
body if the resolution of necessity is not conclusive as to the
truth of the 1240.030 matters (need, benefit and injury). For
example, adoption of the resolution of necessity does not
conclusively establish the matters referred to section 1240.030
(need, benefit and injury) if the property is not entirely locat-
ed within the boundaries of the local entity. If the prop-
erty is outside of the boundaries, the resolution of necessity
creates a presumption that the matters in section 1240.030
(need, benefit and injury) are true.9" The burden is shifted
to the property owner to prove that the matters provided in
section 1240.030 are not true.94
Regardless of whether the property is outside or inside
the boundaries, a 1085 writ of mandate can be used before
the condemnation is filed. Section 1250.30 provides that after
the condemnation action has been filed, the property owner
can challenge the government's right to take on gross abuse
grounds by way of demurrer or answer under 430.30 on
grounds defined by sections 1250.360 and 1250.370."5 Un-
der 1250.360, the owners can challenge the acquisition
whether or not a resolution of necessity has been adopted. 6
89. 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 1125, 219 Cal. Rpir. 365, 367 (1985).
90. 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 898-99, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676, 683-84 (1988).
91. 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 26,, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744, 749 (1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 895 (1983).
92. See San Bernadino County Flood Control Dist. v. Grabowski, 205 Cal.
App. 3d 885, 897, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676, 682 (1988); Anaheimn Redevelopment Agen-
cy v. Dusek, 193 Cal. App. 3d 249, 253, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319, 320 (1987); Hunting-
ton Park Redevelopment Agency v. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 365 (1985); Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Duncan, 142 Cal.
App. 3d 17, 20, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744, 745 (1983), cerl. denied, 464 U.S. 895 (1983).
93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.010, 1245.250, 1250.360 (West 1982).
94. CAL. EVID. CODE § 604 (West 1966).
95. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 430.30, 1250.350, .360, .370 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1 1990); San Bernadino County Flood Control Dist. v. Grabowski, 205 Cal.
App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1988).
96. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.360 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990); see
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The grounds include challenging 1) the use of the land as
not for public use, 2) the authority of the acquiring agency
to condemn, 3) the intent of the acquiring agency to use the
land within seven years or ten years if the property is taken
pursuant to the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973, and 4)
that a resolution of necessity was not adopted after a deter-
mination of 1240.030 matters (need, greatest public benefit
and least private injury).97
In addition to the grounds listed in section 1250.360,98
section 1250.37099 provides that if the condemning agency
Grabowsk, 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1988); Dusek, 193 Cal. App.
3d 249, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987); Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr.
365 (1985); Duncan, 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1983) (for an excel-
lent discussion of the ability to challenge the take).
97. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.360 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990) grounds
include:
(a) The plaintiff is not authorized by statute to exercise the power of
eminent domain for the purpose stated in the complaint.
(b) The stated purpose is not a public use.
(c) The plaintiff does not intend to devote the property described in
the complaint to the stated purpose.
(d) There is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will devote
the described property to the stated purpose within (I) seven years, or
(2) 10 years where the property is taken pursuant to the Federal Aid
Highway Act of 1973, (23 U.S.C.A. § 101) or (3) such longer period
as is reasonable.
(e) The described property is not subject to acquisition by the power
of eminent domain for the stated purpose.
(f) The described property is sought to be acquired pursuant to
[s]ection 1240.410 (excess condemnation), 1240.510 (condemnation for
compatible use), or 1240.610 (condemnation for more necessary pub-
lic use), but the acquisition does not satisfy the requirements of those
provisions.
(g) The described property is sought to be acquired pursuant to
[s]ection 1240.610 (condemnation for more necessary public use), but
the defendant has the right under [s]ection 1240.630 to continue the
public use to which the property is appropriated as a joint use.
(h) Any other 'ground provided by law.
Grabowsk4 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 895, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676, 681 (court stated
1250.360(h) intended to apply to grounds which arise from statutory sources such
as federal or constitutional grounds or specific statutory condemnation prerequi-
sites, not grounds under a Political Reform Act challenge to right to take); CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 37350 (West 1988) (intent to use is defined broadly and includes
purchase, lease, receive, hold and enjoy, and control and dispose of property for
public benefit).
98. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.360 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
99. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.370 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990) (article II
of chapter 4 states resolution of necessity must I) contain all information in
1245.230, 2) must be adopted only after notice and a 1245.235 hearing on
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
has not adopted a resolution which has conclusive effect, the
property owner also can object on the basis of the agency
not adopting a resolution of necessity that satisfied the re-
quirements of article II of chapter 4 (including 1240.030 and
sections beginning 1245.210). Section 1250.370 also provides
that need and location (public benefit with least private inju-
ry) can be challenged where no resolution has been adopt-
ed. 100
If the agency has met its burden of proof, possession
can be obtained from the court to build the needed public
improvement prior to judgment under section 1255.410. '
If the court grants the order for immediate possession, the
only question remaining before the court is the amount of
just compensation to be paid.'0 ° The property owner is
served with the complaint and the agency can apply ex pante
to the court for an order for possession under 1255.410.03
1240.030 matters, and 3) must be adopted by two-thirds vote); Grabowsk4 205 Cal.
App. 3d 885, 894, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676, 680.
100. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.370 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990):
In addition to the grounds listed in [s]ection 1250.360, grounds for
objection to the right to take where the plaintiff has not adopted a
resolution of necessity that conclusively establishes the matters re-
ferred to in section 1240.030 include:
(a) The plaintiff is a public entity and has not adopted a reso-
lution of necessity that satisfies the requirements of article 2 (com-
mencing with section 1245.210) of chapter 4.
(b) The public interest and necessity do not require the pro-
posed project.
(c) The proposed project is not planned or located in the man-
ner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and
the least private injury. 0
(d) The property described in the complaint is not necessary
for the proposed project.
(e) The plaintiff is a quasi-public entity within the meaning of
section 1245.320 and has not satisfied the requirements of article 3
(commencing with section 1245.310) of chapter 4.
See Note, supra note 37 (for an excellent discussion on public interest and necessi-
ty); City of Oakland v. Superior Court of Monterey County, 150 Cal. App. 3d
267, 197 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983), appealed after remand, 174 Cal. App. 3d 414, 220
Cal. Rptr. 153 (1985), ceri. denied, 106 S. Ct. 3300 (1986) (city sought to acquire
by eminent domain professional football team. Supreme Court ruled that the city
could acquire the franchise by eminent domain. The trial court was therefore
foreclosed from inquiring into whether the public interest and necessity required
the proposed project and whether the property was necessary for the proposed
project).
101. CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE § 1255.410 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
102. Cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.420 (West 1982).
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.410 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990); Morgan
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The court will grant the order upon the agency's deposit of
the fair market value offered to the property owner, which
the owner may withdraw pending final determination of the
amount of just compensation. 10 4
Currently, pursuant to 1255.420 California automatically
allows 30 days for property owners to request a stay of the
order of possession due to substantial hardship.0 5 In addi-
tion, if the owner is challenging the right to take, the court
can stay the order for possession under 1255.430.106 If the
property owner is required to move, possession will not be
allowed for 90 days.0 7 The Federal Uniform Act also pro-
vides the same 90-day provision for property owners required
to move from the property being acquired, but does not
require 30 days, or additional time for proof of hardship
where owners do not have to leave their land. 8 Proof of
hardship is required at the time possession is requested un-
der the Uniform Act.
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The 1982 revision to the California Government Code
section 7267.2 and the 1975 revision to the California Civil
Procedure Code section 1255.420 did not produce the in-
tended results. The revision to 7267.2 requiring appraisals of
property and offers to purchase prior to passing the resolu-
tion of necessity places the determination of greatest public
benefit and least private injury too late in the acquisition
process. The result is that if the owner accepts the offer, the
resolution and the formal benefit and injury determination is
never made by the authorized board. Although the acquiring
agency can hold the hearing separately from the resolution,
the hearing is not required unless a resolution is adopted. As
a result, the hearing is only held if a resolution will be re-
quested, and not if the offer is accepted.0 9 If the owner
Hill v. Alberti, 211 Cal. App. 3d 1435, 1437, 260 Cal. Rptr. 42, 43 (1989) (order
entered pursuant to section 1255.410 is not appealable).
104. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.460 (West 1982).
105. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.420 (West 1982); Albeif4 211 Cal. App. 3d
1435, 260 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1989) (challenge to immediate possession).
106. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.430 (West 1982).
107. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267.3 (West 1982).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4651(4-5) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989).
109. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 4651 (West 1982 & Supp. 1989) (the Uniform Act,
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does not accept the offer in order to preserve his right to a
hearing, the project may be so advanced that the governing
body may no longer have any discretion in balancing public
need and private injury."n If the hearing and resolution of
necessity are held late in the process, the property owner
may use the time delay as a tactic to get more than fair mar-
ket value for the property which results in externality costs.
Time delays exist as a result of the 1255.420 automatic 30
days provided to owners to claim hardship after the order
for possession is granted, whether or not a meritorious
hardship claim exists.
Overall, California statutes do not balance private injury
with public need as the Legislature intended."' Consistent
treatment has not been achieved because some property
owners have an opportunity to appear and be heard and
others do not. Some are paid more money than others to
avoid time delays caused by the late resolution of necessity
requirement. Agreement is not promoted among parties
because there are incentives to refuse the offer in order to
preserve the right to hearing and formal determination of
greatest public benefit and least private injury. Public confi-
dence is not promoted.
When the Legislature adds further agency or administra-
tive procedures, or provides for approvals at improper junc-
tures in the negotiating process, an imbalance in public and
private rights occurs. Imbalance occurred as a result of the
on the other hand, does not require offers to be made before a resolution of
necessity is passed. Condemning agencies pass intents to acquire and condemn
prior to the beginning of negotiations and offers. Condemnation will be com-
menced in the court if good faith negotiations. Owners are given an opportunity
to challenge the acquisition at hearings before the appraisals are prepared and of-
fers are made. This puts in place the established need and the intent of the
acquiring agency to buy the property described in the resolution and allows the
agency to take questions of just compensation to the court expeditiously. The
property owner is assured the protection of the court in the event of failure of
negotiations without undue delay. Moreover, the taking can be challenged in the
condemnation action just as it can in California. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-121
(West 1990).
110. See Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d
1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).
111. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982) (legislative intent set forth in this
section included goals of: 1) encouraging property owners to reach agreement
with the governing body to avoid litigation and crowding of courts, 2) expediting
acquisitions, 3) establishing a procedure for consistent treatment of owners, and 4)
to promote public confidence).
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1982 amendment to sections 7267.2 and 1255.420.'12
IV. ANALYSIS
Before the 1982 and 1975 revisions, statute sections
7267.2 and 1255.420 better met California legislative intent
to expedite acquisition procedures and encourage property
owners and acquiring agencies to agree on the amount of
just compensation to be paid.' Pre-1982 California stat-
utes conformed to the Uniform Code and federal Uniform
Act."" The California Legislature intended the 1982 revi-
sion to 7267.2 and the 1975 revision to 1255.420 to encour-
age and expedite acquisition of property by agreement, mini-
mize the time property owners must wait for payment, pro-
vide for an opportunity to appear before the governing body
for a formal determination of public benefit and least private
injury, and promote public confidence." 5 The revisions,
however, increase the cost of public improvements and dis-
courage efficient and timely acquisition, causing the private
owner to wait for payment, and the public to wait for im-
provements. The time for passing the resolution of necessity
is misplaced.
Since the resolution of necessity is uniformly read with
the requirement for hearing, property owners do not have an
opportunity to raise their concerns about public benefit and
private injury until they refuse to accept the agency's offer to
purchase. Futhermore, because the resolution of necessity is
112. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267.2 (West 1982 & Supp 1 1990); CAL. CIV. PROc.
CODE § 1255.420 (West 1982). California statutes should be revised in order to
give property owners more input on the project earlier in the process, and enable
public agencies to achieve more efficient acquisition of property, speedier rebuild-
ing of the needed public improvements such as deteriorating water and sewer
lines, roads and bridges, parks, drainage facilities, utilities for electricity and tele-
phone, as well as projects that provide housing for the homeless and lower-income
or elderly persons, and urban redevelopment of slums.
113. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982) ("to encourage and expedite
the acquisition of real property by agreement with owners, to avoid litigation and
relieve congestion in the courts, to assure consistent treatment for owners in the
public programs, and to promote public confidence in public land acquisition
practices . . . . "); 42 U.S.C. § 4651(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 7267.1 (West 1982) (the public entities were directed to "make every
reasonable effort to acquire expeditiously real property by negotiation.").
114. 42 U.S.C. § 4651(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1989); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
7267.1 (West 1982).
115. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267 (West 1982).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
only passed if negotiations fail and condemnation is sought
in court, the hearing is likewise not held until negotiations
fail." 6 Owners and agencies are not encouraged to agree
on the amount of just compensation. In fact, the inability to
appear and be heard and have a formal determination of
benefit and injury discourages negotiations and undermines
public confidence. Owners have valid concerns to voice in
formal hearings. This change in legislation encourages prop-
erty owners not to reach agreement in order to take advan-
tage of their rights afforded by the resolution of necessity
procedure. Those property owners who reach an agreement
with the acquiring agency through negotiations never have an
opportunity to appear and be heard.
Acquisition is not expedited. The acquiring agency must
request a place on the authorizing board's agenda, prepare a
packet for presentation, send notice to the property owner,
and attend the hearing before the complaint is filed to ac-
quire the property through the court in a condemnation
action. This process takes an additional four months. 1 7
Once the hearing is held and the resolution is passed, the
acquiring agency is given nine months to prepare documents,
serve process, and authorize possession in order to begin
construction of the public improvement."' Once the order
for possession is granted, the property owner must wait until
the money is deposited by the acquiring agency in a fund
established by the court."' The time the property owner
must wait for payment has not been minimized. Further
problems arise because the owner is unlikely to continue to
maintain or improve his property, causing the community to
suffer unsightly deterioration known as condemnation
blight. 2
0
Moreover, to avoid this time delay, the acquiring agency
may offer more than fair market value for the property. This
116. See ACQUISITION PROCEDURAL MANUAL, supra note 17.
117. Id. at 3-6.
118. POLICY MANUAL, supra note 27, 01-105-01.
119. ACQUIsrION PROCEDURAL MANUAL, supa note 17 § 452.001-.027 at 1-8.
120. Alexander, Time is Money: Detering Condemnation Blight Through Stricter
Standards for Inequitable Precondem nation Activities, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 763
(1982); Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1972); Cambria Spring Co. v. Pico Rivera, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1080, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 772 (1985).
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causes externality costs. When more than fair market value is
paid to the owner, society pays the cost of the individual's
gain. 121 If the property owner knows the agency will pay
more for the property if the offer to purchase is refused, the
owner will refuse and hold out for more money, thereby
decreasing the possibility for early settlement. Further, if the
acquiring agency pays more over time to finally encourage
settlement, each owner may be paid a different amount over
the fair market value, thus encouraging arbitrary practices
and discouraging public confidence. Statutory procedure such
as the 1975 revision to 1255.420 and the 1982 revision to
7267.2 (requiring resolution of necessity after appraisals and
offers) inefficiently allocate cost of acquiring property for
public improvement.
Commentators state that "[t]here are at least two distinct
goals for adopting allocation cost rules: the equity goal of
compensating victims and the efficiency goal of minimizing
costs to society as a whole".' 22 If a statutory acquisition sys-
tem is adopted which is complicated and time consuming,
the property owner will receive a signal that the government
will pay an excess amount of compensation to shorten the
time necessary for acquisition under the statute. 123 The
time delay will not only increase the cost of the property,
but will increase the cost of construction. 12 4 Each year land,
materials and labor are more expensive. An analysis of the
California Department of Transportation's time schedule for
acquisition under the current statutes indicates approximately
two years are necessary for the purchase of property. 12 5 A
similar time schedule under the federal acquisition statute is
six months.'
26
If the resolution of necessity and the hearing are held at
any time in the process after the agency determines their
121. See Cooter, supra note 55.
122. See Cooter, supra note 55 at 1.
123. See Cooter, supra note 55.
124. Market Trnds, ENGINEERING NEWS REC., May 10, 1990, at 48.
125. POLICY MANUAL, supra note 27.
126. See STATE OF COLORADO, DEPARTMENT OF LOCAL AFFAIRS, 1990 GUIDE-
BOOK FOR PUBLIC FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS UNDER FEDERAL COM-
MUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM (rev. ed. 1990) (this manual sets
forth the typical time schedule and procedure for federal projects and land acqui-
sition under the Uniform Act).
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intent to acquire the property, the procedure achieves more
efficiency in terms of time and cost while providing enough
time for notice to the owner and an opportunity for the
owner to appear and be heard. Since the hearing and resolu-
tion of necessity process could occur simultaneously with the
final design, the additional time currently needed to pass the
resolution after negotiations fail will be avoided. Acquiring
agencies may adopt uniform policies to pay only the ap-
praised amount, resulting in more consistent treatment for
owners. Legislative intent is better achieved when 1) the own-
er is paid for the property taken without waiting for govern-
ment compliance with lengthy processes, 2) condemnation
blight does not set in, and 3) the owner does not receive the
message that the government will pay more than the proper-
ty would bring on the open market in order to shorten the
acquisition time. Further, the government is not faced with
increased costs of property and construction. The likelihood
of allocating costs fairly and efficiently is greater. Perfect
compensation might be achieved. The private interests of all
owners are better protected. The owner has the ability to be
heard earlier in the process, before the project is fixed by
other constraints. Other constraints include commitments to
fund a project through bonds,'27 commitments to develop-
ers in urban renewal projects, 12 or the constraint produced
by an alignment of a highway project being fixed by pur-
chase of substantially all of the property required for the
highway project.
If the resolution is passed too late in the process (such
as after adjoining parcels of property have been purchased),
it may be very difficult for the governing body to reevaluate
need and location. California statutes provide that need and
location must be considered when passing the resolution of
necessity. 129 The Law Review Commission recommended
the resolution of necessity process to encourage acquiring
agencies to take a good look at "need for the property and
the project itself."""0 The board, which has the authority to
127. Governments sell bonds to the public to raise money for public projects.
Often the bonds are secured by government revenues.
128. See Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d
1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).
129. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 1982).
130. 13 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at 1001, 1026-27 (1976) ("in addi-
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pass the resolution, should look at the need and project
before the purchase of property begins. Otherwise, the
board's action can become a mere formality.'" Further, the
1982 amendment excluded any opportunity of bringing im-
portant information into the process when the board has
discretion to make a considered decision.
The owner currently has four options: 1) to reach an
agreement with the acquiring agency and transfer title to it
without the opportunity to be heard, 2) to refuse all offers
made by the acquiring agency in order to have the opportu-
nity to appear and be heard, 3) to hold out, not accepting
the acquiring agency's offer until the offer becomes so high
it no longer matters to the property owner whether or not
he has the opportunity to appear and be heard (rights are
circumvented by the high offer, and externality costs appear),
or 4) to challenge the resolution of necessity by attempting
to show gross abuse of discretion, or that no discretion exist-
ed when the resolution of necessity was passed.
A situation often arises where the property owner has
internal problems that are not apparent to the designers or
planners of a project. In examining a realistic hypothetical,
the statutory requirements discussed in the background sec-
tion of this comment may become more clear. Suppose a
highway project is planned that will widen an existing road
through a growing industrial area. Ten feet of land is needed
on each side of the highway along a two-mile corridor. Prop-
erty will be purchased from owners on each side of the high-
way, including Lot A on the south and Lots B and C on the
north, as well as lots adjoining A, B, and C for a distance of
two miles. Each lot has driveway access from the highway.
Lot A is developed with two buildings which have the re-
quired parking area and a delivery dock. No buildings have
been built on Lots B and C to date. The project staff decid-
ed to widen the highway equally on each side making con-
struction easier. There would be no need to restripe the
lanes and move the median; the governing body would only
need to construct an outside lane on each side. The highway
tion to informing the property owner of the authority for the proposed acquisi-
tion, it helps to insure that the public entity makes a considered decision of both
the need for the property as well as the proposed project itself.").
131. See Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).
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agent has appraisals prepared on each parcel of land needed
for the project, and makes offers to purchase to the owners
as required by section 7267.2. t12
All of the owners of lots within the two-mile corridor,
except the owners of Lots A, B, and C, accept the offers and
transfer title to the acquiring agency. Personal notice and an
opportunity to be heard was not given pursuant to section
1245.2352" s The acquiring agency read section 1245.235
(which provides for the hearing) as only necessary if it need-
ed to pass a resolution of necessity.' s4 A resolution of ne-
cessity was not required since the owners accepted their of-
fers. Section 1245.235 provides that the governing body can
only pass a resolution of necessity if it has given notice to
the record owners and provided them with an opportunity to
be heard on matters referred to in 1240.040.'- 5 Section
1240.040 provides that the acquiring agency can only exercise
the power of eminent domain if a resolution has been
passed and if it meets the requirements of 1245.210,
1245.220, 1245.230.136
Section 1245.230 is crucial, providing the governing body
must determine and declare that public interest and necessity
require the project, the property is necessary for the project,
and most importantly, the project is planned or located so
that the public will benefit the most and the private owner
will be injured the least.'37 This hearing and declaration is
generally not held if the offer is accepted' although the
hearing can be held at any time, including at the same time
as the any other hearing. 139 Section 1245.235(d) provides
that the governing body can satisfy the hearing requirement
through any other procedure where personal notice and a
reasonable opportunity to appear has been given."4 For ex-
ample, the Legislative Committee Comment-Senate 1975
132. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
133. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
134. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.040, 1245.235, .210, .220, .230 (West 1982
& Supp. I 1990).
135. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
136. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.040 (West 1982).
137. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.230 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
138. See AcQuISMON PRODEDUAL MANUAL, supra note 17.
139. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1245.235(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
140. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1245.235(d) (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
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Addition to 1245.235(d) suggests this hearing be combined
with the hearings on environmental impact reports."
Alternatively a separate hearing could be held during final
design.
The owners who accepted the agency's offer in this hy-
pothetical may have been able to provide information at the
hearing that would make the project plan or design better.
However, the owners accepting the offer in the hypothetical
did not necessarily suffer any injury without the governing
body's considered determination of the most public benefit
and least private injury. These lots were undeveloped. Lots B
and C were also undeveloped lots in the hypothetical. How-
ever, Lot B and Lot C owners decided not to accept the
agency's offer to purchase.
The agency offered Lot B and C owners more money,
hoping to entice them into accepting the offer. They rea-
soned that if the owners accepted the additional money,
construction would not be delayed, and increased costs of
land and construction materials and labor could be avoided.
The Lot C owner understood his power to delay the project
meant more money to him. 4 ' He accepted an offer over
fair market value just before the acquiring agency decided he
would never agree. 43 Again, the agency did not hold the
1245.235 hearing. It (agency) was not required to since no
resolution of necessity was requested.
The acquiring agency never offered the Lot B owner
enough to override his desire to tell the governing body
what he knew about his property and the project. The Lot B
owner merely wanted to have a chance to speak his mind
about the project in a formal hearing. He refused the offer
in order to have the opportunity to appear and be heard
even if it meant he would not get paid for the property for
141. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235(d) (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
142. See Epstein, supra note 42.
143. This is an example of how externality costs are incurred. The additional
costs have been external to the individual due to self-interest. Society, the taxpay-
er, bear the amount of money paid over what the land was actually worth, the
fair market value. This amount is more than Lot C owner could get on the open
market if he sold his property. Additional costs are also incurred as a result of
the time delay due to increased construction costs of materials and labor. See
Cooper, supra note 55.
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another eight months,'44 and even if it meant the construc-
tion would be delayed.
The agency prepared the information packets to present
to the authorizing board and requested a place on the agen-
da. The Lot B owner was notified as required by
1245.235.' 45 The Lot B owner requested the ability to ap-
pear within 15 days as provided for in 1245.235(b)(3).' 46 At
the hearing, the acquiring agency explained the plan to wid-
en the highway by adding a lane to each side of the existing
roadway. No presentation was made as to the value of Lot
B's land compared to the other properties available for the
project. There was no evidence that the agency considered
shifting the alignment of the road to lessen private impact,
only that the design was chosen so that an additional outside
lane could be built on each side of the existing highway. The
resolution of necessity was passed, and the acquiring agency
proceeded to prepare the information necessary to file the
condemnation action with the court. Again, the agency of-
fered more than fair market value to avoid the time delay
and expense of condemnation proceedings. The Lot B owner
accepted the agency's offer before he incurred the expense
of a lawyer to prepare an answer to the condemnation action
in the court.
Unlike Lot B and Lot C owners, the Lot A owner was
not interested in more money or preserving his right to be
heard. The Lot A owner had a much more complicated
problem. The ten feet required for the project reduced his
parking lot and driveway area in such a way that he could
no longer get his delivery trucks into and out of the proper-
ty without backing onto the busy highway. Currently, there is
enough room for the trucks to enter the property and turn
around to leave. When he built the buildings on the land,
the city required him to have enough room for the trucks to
turn around on the property before re-entering the highway.
Further, he discovered that it is against the law to back onto
the highway, his insurance company would not cover any
144. See POLICY MANUAL, supra note 27 at 01-105-01.
145. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
146. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235(b)(3) (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990)
(ability to appear and be heard waived if not requested within 15 days of the date
the notice sent).
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claims for damage if the trucks were hit, and the drivers
refused to make deliveries if they had to back onto the high-
way. The Lot A owner refused to accept the offer to pur-
chase. The agency prepared the packets for presentation to
the authorizing board and a hearing date was set after the
Lot A owner requested an appearance within the required 15
days. He raised his concern at the hearing when the resolu-
tion of necessity was to be passed. The agency presented its
plan to widen the existing road on each side. Again, no evi-
dence of the value of other available property was presented.
The Lot A owner claimed the project was not planned or
located to achieve the greatest public good and the least
private injury.'47 If the highway had been shifted to the
other side, less private injury would occur. The other side
was undeveloped land. Lot A was developed with buildings.
His business required deliveries. He would not be able to do
business on the property if the land was taken for the high-
way. The Lot A owner requested that the road be shifted
north a few feet so that he could turn his trucks around on
the property. The board said the alignment was fixed; the
other land necessary for the project had already been pur-
chased. The resolution was passed.
Lot A owner decides to challenge the resolution of ne-
cessity in the court. He could seek judicial review before the
condemnation action was filed, by filing a writ of mandate
pursuant to section 1085,148 or after the action was filed by
objecting to the right to take under 1245.255.' The judi-
cial inquiry examines whether or not there was a gross abuse
of discretion by the governing body'in passing the resolution
of necessity; whether or not the 1240.030 matters were con-
sidered without a gross abuse of discretion.' 50
147. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 1982) (one of the determina-
tions the governing body must make in passing the resolution of necessity).
148. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1980); Morgan Hill v. Alberti, 211
Cal. App. 3d 1435, 260 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1989); Anaheim Redevelopment Agency v.
Dusek, 193 Cal. App. 3d 249, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987); Huntington Park Rede-
velopment Agency v. Duncan, 142 *Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 895 (1983).
149. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.255 (West 1982); Dusek, 193 Cal. App. 3d
249, 39 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987); Huntington Park v. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d
1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985); Duncan, 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744
(1983).
150. Dusek, 193 Cal. App. 3d 249, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987) (discussed judicial
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Under a 1085 mandate,' 5 ' Lot A owner will object to
the right to take pursuant to 1245.255 (right to take objec-
tion after action filed). The resolution of necessity conclu-
sively established the findings of 1240.030 (need, benefit and
injury).'52  The resolution will not be conclusive as to
1240.030 matters (need, benefit and injury), however, if the
Lot A owner can show there was gross abuse of discretion by
the governing body. 5
The Lot A owner will show that implicit in the require-
ment of 1245.235 (notification and hearing requirements)
and the adoption of a resolution of necessity under 1240.040
(acquiring agency can only condemn after resolution) and
1245.220 (eminent domain proceedings can not be com-
menced until the governing body adopts a resolution), the
government must engage in good faith consideration of the
pros and cons of the issues provided in 1240.030.' Sec-
tion 1240.030 requires the governing body determine after
the 1245.235 hearing (section sets forth the notification and
hearing requirements), that 1) the project is necessary for a
public purpose, 2) the property is necessary for the project,
and 3) the project is compatible with the greatest public
benefit and the least private injury.'55 Lot A owner will as-
sert that the there was a gross abuse of discretion as the
governing body did not consider the injury he would suffer
in comparison to the lack of injury to other property
available in the area for the project. With the taking, Lot A
review under 1085 and defines abuse of discretion as a questioning of the
judgment of the governing body, stating that a court will not substitute its own
judgment regarding need and location, but rather is "limited to an examination of
the proceedings to determine whether adoption of the resolution by the governing
body was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support"); see 14
CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at 87 (1978) (recommendations relating to
review of resolution of necessity by writ of mandate).
151. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1980).
152. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.250 (West 1982) (resolution of necessity
has conclusive effect as the property is within the boundaries of the agency's juris-
diction, which our hypothetical assumes, the resolution has a rebuttable presump-
tion under section 1245.150(b) if the property is located outside of the bound-
aries). See also San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. v. Grabowski, 205 Cal.
App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1988); Note, supra note 37.
153. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.255(b) (West 1982).
154. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1240.040, 1245.220, .235 (West 1982 & Supp. I
1990); Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121,
1125, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365, 367 (1985).
155. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1240.030 (West 1982).
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owner will be unable to turn trucks around on this property,
resulting in little or no ability to receive deliveries by truck.
He will be out of business without truck delivery. On the
other hand, the land on the other side of the road is vacant,
and the owners would not suffer comparable injury if the
road was designed to use the unimproved land. Lot A owner
can offer evidence that the board made their decision based
on a plan to widen on each side, instead of a weighing of
the pros and cons of greatest public benefit and least private
injury. Moreover, the governing body stated the alignment
was fixed since other parcels had already been purchased,
indicating the governing body had no discretion in the deci-
sion. Adoption of the resolution of necessity was merely a
rubber stamp.
The Lot A owner can use the Huntington Park Redevelop-
ment Agency v. Slauson156 case to substantiate his claim that
the governing body had no discretion or if discretion existed,
there was a gross abuse. In Slauson, the acquiring agency did
not hold the 1245.235 hearing (section sets forth the notifica-
tion and hearing requirements) until the governing body was
ready to adopt the resolution of necessity. By the time the
governing body held the hearing, irrevocable commitments
had been made, such as a contract with a developer which
incorporated Slauson's land and the issuance of revenue
bonds to finance the redevelopment project. The court stated
the hearing was a sham at which the predetermined result
was simply rubber stamped.'57 The court further held the
hearing was affected not only by a gross abuse of discretion,
but by elimination of discretion.' Once this finding has
been made, the resolution of necessity does not have a con-
clusive effect 59 and the burden of proving, by a prepon-
derance of evidence, falls on the acquiring agency to show
the taking was proper (compatible with the least private inju-
ry and greatest public benefit requirement). In Slauson, the
court found the governing body had not met the burden of
proof. The court stated it would be crucial in determining
156. 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).
157. Id. at 1127, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
158. Id.
159. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.250 (West 1982); Huntington Park Redevel-
opment Agency v. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 1128, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365, 369
(1985).
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cost and injury for the agency to assess the effect the loss of
60 per cent of Slauson's parking area would have on his
business.
60
'
The Lot A owner may be able to draw a close parallel to
the Slauson case.' The project's effect on Lot A owner's
business was not considered in the determination of least
private injury. The governing board only considered the plan
to widen the highway on each side by ten feet. The agency
would not need to restripe the lanes or move the median.
Further, the governing body stated the alignment was already
fixed by the purchase of other parcels, indidating discretion
might already be eliminated. No proper determination was
ever made.
However, proper determinations were made by the agen-
cies prior to passing resolutions of necessity in other cases
which the Lot A owner would need to distinguish from his
situation. Grabowski,162  Dusek,163  and Duncan'6 4  survived
the property owner's challenge as the acquiring agencies
actually made a considered determination of greatest public
benefit, least private injury. In Grabowski165 the court found
the. acquiring agency did not have irrevocable commitments
in the nature of revenue bonds that removed discretion,
unlike the governing body in Slauson.'66 Further, the gov-
erning body was prepared to consider alternative construc-
tion proposals, but Grabowski did not request alternative
plans, suggest alternative plans, or ask for a continuance of
the hearing to pursue the information. Moreover, the
agency's engineer presented detailed project specifics that
addressed the benefit and injury issue.'67
In Dusek,'68 the court reversed the trial court's dismiss-
al of the condemnation of the Pickwick Hotel. The trial
court erred by imposing a duty upon the condemning agency
160. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 1129, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
161. Id.
162. 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1988).
163. 193 Cal. App. 3d 249, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987).
164. 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1983), cefl. denied, 464 U.S. 895
(1983).
165. 205 Cal. App. 3d at 898-99, 252 Cal. Rptr. at 683-84.
166. 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 1127, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365, 369 (1985).
167. Grabowsh4 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676.
168. 193 Cal. App. 3d 249, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987).
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to state what the specific findings were in the determination
of need, benefit and injury. The California Court of Appeals
held that the court must search for a gross abuse of discre-
tion, not retrace the analytical route of the determination.
The court of appeals resolved the issue by finding that 1)
there was a valid public use as the purpose of the acquisition
was to eliminate blight of the area; redevelopment of
blighted areas constitutes public use, 2) the agency had the
statutory power to condemn the land within the redevelop-
ment district where Dusek's land was located, and 3) the
agency adopted a redevelopment plan which included
Dusek's blighted building, attempting to remove a blighted
structure." 9 Implicit in the redevelopment plan was the
agency's weighing of the public benefit and private injury.
No gross abuse of discretion was found.
In Duncan' 170 the court held that there was no gross
abuse of discretion by the redevelopment agency in accepting
Spitzer's proposal and passing the resolution of necessity to
condemn a parking lot owned by Duncan. The agency ac-
cepted proposals from both Duncan and Spitzer to redevelop
a blighted area. Duncan and Spitzer both proposed to ex-
pand their businesses onto the parking lot adjoining both
properties. Duncan owned the parking lot. Spitzer's proposal
provided 35 new jobs compared to Duncan's proposal which
provided only eight. Spitzer's plan added $2 million to the
area's revenues, while there was no comparable showing of
revenue increases by Duncan's plan. Spitzer made a definite
commitment to build, Duncan would not commit. Further,
the agency found Duncan's remaining land would easily ac-
commodate his proposed construction.1
7
'
While the Lot A owner is considering these cases and
whether to file a 1085 writ of mandate pursuant to
1245.255,72 the hypothetical acquiring agency will file the
169. Id.
170. 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1983), ceil. denied, 464 U.S. 895
(1983).
171. Id.
172. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1085, 1245.255 (West 1982) (if the 1085 writ
of mandate is pending and the eminent domain action is filed by the acquiring
agency, the writ may be prosecuted to completion only if required by the interest
of justice. The 1978 Legislative Comment to 1245.255 suggests the writ may be
prosecuted to completion if the matter had already been heard, and a judgment
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condemnation action and serve the Lot A owner with a sum-
mons and pleadings prepared according to 1250.125.173 Un-
der 1245.255, the Lot A owner will need to bring his chal-
lenge by objecting to the right to take pursuant to 1250.350,
by demurrer or answer as provided in section 430.30 on
grounds authorized by 1250.360 (plaintiff not authorized by
statute to exercise the power of eminent domain, purpose is
not a public use, property will not be devoted to public use,
property will not be used within seven years) or 1250.370 (if
resolution of necessity has not been passed, owner can chal-
lenge need, benefit and injury, or the governing body has no
statutory authority)., 74 The Lot A owner will not challenge
the governing body on some 1250.360 grounds, such as that
1) the statutory authority did not exist for the agency to
exercise the power of eminent domain, since the hypothetical
agency has statutory authority to condemn 2) the stated pur-
pose is not a public use, since the stated purpose of highway
construction, is a public use, 3) the agency had no intent to
devote the property to public use, because the Lot A owner
has no evidence the agency does not intend to devote the
property to the highway purpose, 4) the agency has no cur-
rent use for the property, because the agency indicated the
property needed from the Lot A owner was for immediate
construction, the agency will be using the land for construc-
tion within a reasonable time. Nor will Lot A owner claim
that the agency is purchasing excess land, since he has no
evidence that the property sought is excessive.1 75 Lastly, the
owner does not have evidence of fraud or bribery on the
part of the acquiring agency, which can also be used to chal-
lenge a taking under 1245.270.176
invalidating the resolution of necessity was being prepared); San Bernadino County
Flood Control Dist. v. Grabowski, 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676
(1988) (once the condemnation action filed, objection to right to take pursuant to
this title as prescribed by 1245.255(a)(2), not by writ of mandate).
173. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.125 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
174. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 430.30, 1250.350, .360, .370 (West 1982 &
Supp. I 1990); Giabowski, 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 252 Cal Rptr. 676.
175. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1250.360 (West 1987 & Supp. I 1990);
Grabowski, 205 Cal. App. 3d at 894-95 (1250.360(h) provides that challenge can be
made on any other grounds by law; the court interpreted these grounds to mean
federal or constitutional grounds, not a challenge under the Political Reform Act
of 1974 (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 91003(b) (West 1987 & Supp. 1990)).
176. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1245.270 (West 1982); Grabowski, 205 Cal. App.
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The Lot A owner could try to attack the conclusive ef-
fect of the resolution of necessity by showing a gross abuse
of discretion, or no discretion, as contemplated by the 1085
writ of mandate. The owner could use section 1250.370 to
invalidate the resolution with the same argument, that the
governing body did not consider the location that would be
compatible with greatest public benefit and least private inju-
ry. The Lot A owner could claim no such determination was
ever made; rather the governing body rubber stamped the
decision as the alignment was fixed by prior acquisition of
other parcels. 177 The owner can distinguish his case from
those in Grabowski,178 Dusek, 179 and Duncan s" by show-
ing the agency acquiring the Lot A owner's property only
examined the design and the widening of ten feet on each
side, without considering least private injury. The highway
could be built on the vacant land on the other side of the
existing road, leaving the Lot A owner in business.
If the hearing required by 1245.23581 had been held
during final design, the Lot A owner would have been able
to discuss the internal circulation problem with the agency in
time for the design to be shifted to the other side, where
least private injury would occur with the same public benefit.
If after considered determination, least private injury and
greatest public benefit still existed with the designed align-
ment, the agency would be able to meet the evidentiary bur-
den when the right to acquire is challenged by the property
owner. However, agencies are not required to hold these
hearings at all unless a resolution of necessity is being adopt-
ed.
If the agency does not hold the hearing as required by
1245.235112 early enough in the process, the board's discre-
3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1988) (court concluded a $250 political donation did
not constitute bribery as there was no requisite corrupt intent to influence un-
lawfully).
177. See Huntington Park Redevelopment Agency v. Slauson, 173 Cal. App. 3d
1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).
178. 205 Cal. App. 3d 885, 252 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1988).
179. 193 Cal. App. 3d 249, 239 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1987).
180. 142 Cal. App. 3d 17, 190 Cal. Rptr. 744 (1983), cel. denied, 464 U.S. 895
(1983).
181. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
182. CAL. CIV. PROc. CODE § 1245.235 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
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tion may be eliminated as it was in Slauson."'8 However, ac-
quiring agencies would be able to hold hearings and pass the
resolutions of necessity earlier in the process if the revision
to California Government Code 7267 is repealed. The de-
termination of greatest public benefit and least private injury
would, therefore, be made at a more appropriate time in the
project. The determination could then be made before offers
are made and accepted.
Sometimes agencies offer justifications for not holding
hearings early in the process, including that the owner can
bring an inverse condemnation action against the agency. In
inverse condemnation actions, property owners file the con-
demnation instead of waiting for the governing body to do
so. The owner claims the agency's project in effect has
amounted to a taking of his property.184 The owner re-
quests that the amount of just compensation be determined
by the court. However, inverse condemnation actions cannot
be based solely on early hearings. If the property owner is
sent a notice and a hearing is held on the issues of least
private injury and public use, the property owner can later
be notified that the property is no longer needed for the
project, and inverse condemnation proceedings are avoided.
Resolutions of necessity do not have to be passed at the time
of the hearing, although passing a resolution of necessity on
a particular parcel will not result by itself in an inverse con-
demnation action either.8 5 However, the agency must file
183. 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).
184. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.260 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
185. See Cambria Spring Co. v. Pico Rivera, 171 Cal. App. 3d 1080, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 772 (1985) (quoting Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d
1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972)) ("certain announcements by a public entity of
intent to condemn property, which result in a decline in the market value of the
property prior to institution of condemnation proceedings, may give rise to dam-
ages in an inverse condemnation action. However, the court further held that to
allow recovery under all circumstances . . . might deter public agencies from
announcing sufficiently in advance their intention to condemn."); Id. (quoting
Merced Irrigation Dist. v. Woolstenhuhne, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 496 n.9, 93 Cal. Rptr.
833, 851 n.9 (1971) ("a reasonable interval of time between an announcement of
intent and the issuance of the summons serves the public interest. To insure
meaningful public input into condemnation decisions, it may be necessarj for the
condemnee to bear slight incidental loss."); Id. at 1090 ("when the condemner acts
unreasonably in issuing precondemnation statements, either by excessively delaying
eminent domain action or by other oppressive conduct, our constitutional concern
over property rights requires that the owner be compensated."); Id. at 1092 ("good
faith negotiation by a municipality for purchase of private property over period of
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the condemnation action within six months of passing the
resolution or the owner can bring the inverse condemnation
action. After six months, the agency still has the right to
withdraw the resolution before the owner commences the
action. If the resolution is withdrawn within six months or
before the owner files an inverse condemnation action after
six months, the owner loses the right to claim inverse con-
demnation. 18
6
The six month time period for inverse condemnation
begins to run when the resolution of necessity is passed, not
at the time of the 1245.235 hearing. Therefore, the acquiring
agency should hold the hearing at a separate time, and adopt
time reasonable under the circumstances would likewise not give rise to a cause
of action for inverse condemnation"); Selby Realty Co. v. San Buenaventura, 10
Cal. 3d 110,. 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973) (revealing proposed street extension did
not amount to an inverse condemnation); Smith v. California, 50 Cal. App. 3d
529, 123 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975) (property owners could not recover damages for
inverse condemnation even though market value may diminish, where the state
announced its intent to construct a freeway along a tentative route and had fol-
lowed orderly procedures, as substantial time was necessarily required before a
freeway plan is implemented and any such damages would add inordinate costs to
every project). But see Toso v. Santa Barbara, 101 Cal. App. 3d 934, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 210 (1980) (prerequisite for damage for inverse condemnation must be
formal resolution of condemnation and other action toward acquisition of proper-
ty, but not merely public discussion, debate and statements advocating public ac-
quisition of property); People ex rel Dept. Pub. Wks. v. Peninsula Enterprises,
Inc., 91 Cal. App. 3d 332, 153 Cal. Rptr. 895 (1979) (court used a "freeway agree-
ment" as the date from which the six months could be measured to determine
unreasonable delay).
186. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.260 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990) provides:
(a) If a public entity has adopted a resolution of necessity but has
not commenced an eminent domain proceeding to acquire the prop-
erty within six months after the date of adoption of the resolu-
tion . . . the property owner may, by an action in inverse condemna-
tion.
(I) Require tihe public entity to ake the property and pay com-
pensation therefor.
(2) Recover damages from the public entity for any interfer-
ence with the possession and use of the property resulting from
adoption of the resolution.
c) A public entity may commence an eminent domain proceeding or
rescind a resolution of necessity as a matter of right at any time be-
fore the property owner commences an action under this section. If
the public entity commences an eminent domain proceeding or re-
scinds the resolution of necessity before the property owner com-
mences an action under this section, the property owner may not
thereafter bring an action under this section.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
the resolution of necessity later if it is apparent that more
than six months will be required for acquisition. Currently,
however, the resolution cannot be passed until appraisals and
offers are made. Since the hearing is routinely held together
with the passage of the resolution, the hearing occurs well
after it should be held to give property owners an opportuni-
ty to appear and be heard before a formal governing body
authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain. If the
1982 language requiring the resolution after appraisals and
offers is dropped, or the resolution is required before ap-
praisals and offers, the governing body would be more in-
clined to hold the hearing earlier, pass the resolution, and
move the construction of the needed public improvement
along within six months.
Enabling the governing body to hold the 1245.235 hear-
ing and pass the resolution nearer in time to the completion
of the final design will encourage acquisitions within the six
month period required prior to inverse condemnation, thus
fulfilling the legislative intent. The additional time between
when negotiations fail and when the resolution is passed will
be eliminated. Further, reduced time for acquisitions miti-
gates the effect of hold-out tactics (the power to delay the
project by the additional time needed to go to the governing
body for the resolution is decreased). All of the acquisitions
necessary for one project can be presented to the governing
body for authority to exercise the power of eminent domain
at one time, giving the property owners collective input be-
fore the project is so fixed that the board has no discretion
to consider greatest public benefit and least private injury. By
providing the opportunity to be heard early in the process,
public confidence is promoted since the citizen will be able
to contribute to the project when his contributions can be in-
corporated into the end result. The property owner does not
have to refuse the offer to purchase in order to preserve the
right to appear and be heard.
As of today, the Department of Transportation estimates
that approximately 20 months pass before a challenge can be
filed or an order for immediate possession can be granted by
the court.' 7 Instead of the automatic 30 day provision,
187. See POLICY MANUAL, supra note 27.
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1255.420188 should be revised to allow the property owner
to request additional time at the ex parte hearing on the
order for possession 8 9 if a meritorious claim exists in
which the owner can show substantial hardship. Further,
protection is currently provided by section 1255.43019
which sets forth that the court can stay the order of posses-
sion if there is reasonable probability the property owner will
prevail in the objection to the acquisition such as in the
hypothetical posed in this comment and in the Slauson'91
case.
The elimination of the automatic 30 day period for filing
for hardship would relieve acquiring agencies of the addition-
al 30 days if no claim exists due to the agency's proper han-
dling of the precondemnation activities. Construction of bad-
ly needed improvements could begin without waiting through
an automatic 30 days that may be unnecessary. The time lag
is not required to protect owners who only want the matter
of just compensation determined. Therefore, if all of the
conditions to filing the condemnation action have been satis-
fied, and the acquisition is not questioned, the automatic
30-day lag time is unnecessary and should be eliminated.19
Possession should be exchanged immediately upon deposit of
the appraised amount of just compensation. The deposit is
available for the property owner to withdraw pending final
determination of the amount the owner will be paid.
V. PROPOSAL
1. The first sentence of section 7267.2 should be revised
to read "before the initiation of negotiations for real proper-
ty, the public shall establish an amount which it believes to
188. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.420 (West 1982).
189. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.410 (West 1982).
190. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.430 (West 1982).
191. 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1985).
192. In Colorado, possession in cases where no move is required, is granted
immediately at the hearing where the order for possession is granted. Notice of
the hearing for an order for immediate possession is served with the summons
and complaint for the condemnation proceeding. Valid issues of hardship can be
raised. The 90-day provision between granting possession to the agency and actual
possession provided for circumstances where relocation is necessary should be left
in place. The difference seems to be that hardship is suffered if the owner must
move, but is not substantial enough to hold up a project any longer if no move
is required. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-1-108 (West 1990).
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be just compensation therefor, and shall make a prompt
offer to acquire the property . . . " instead of the current
language "prior to adopting a resolution of necessity pursu-
ant to section 1245.230 and initiating negotiations for acqui-
sition of real property, the public entity shall establish an
amount which it believes to be just compensation therefor,
and shall make an offer to the owner .... .193
Acquiring agencies consistently interpret the 1245.235
hearing together with adopting the resolution of necessity.
The resolution of necessity is only necessary if a condemna-
tion action is filed in court. Thus, the agency reasons the
hearing required prior to adopting the resolution is only
necessary if the resolution is requested. This policy enables
the agency to approach the board authorized to pass the
resolution only one time, and only to present the parcels in
which negotiations have failed and condemnation actions are
required in the court. This policy denies the property owner
the opportunity to be heard unless the owner refuses the
offer to purchase. Moreover, a considered determination of
greatest public benefit and least private injury may not be
made for all owners affected by the project.
Further, agencies are likely to find irrevocable commit-
ments have been made which in effect remove the discretion
of the governing body to make the determination. Often
project financing commitments are made in order to pay for
property needed for the project, or commitments to develop-
ers in urban redevelopment projects are made before proper-
ty is acquired. Attracting a developer is crucial to the rede-
velopment and such commitments are essential. Even the
purchase of substantially all of the land for a highway project
may be seen as irrevocable commitment if it fixes the align-
ment.
2. The 1982 language added to Section 7267.2 should be
repealed. The provision that the agency can only adopt reso-
lutions of necessity after appraisals and offers places this
requirement too late in the process, in lieu of the consistent
reading of the adoption of resolutions and the 1245.235
hearing. The intent of Congress is not met; private property
rights are not protected, speedier and more efficient acquisi-
193. CAL. COV'T CODE § 7267.2 (West 1990).
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tion of property is not achieved, and public confidence is not
promoted.
If the language is revised, private rights will still be pro-
tected by 7267.2 which requires appraisals and offers to pur-
chase. If appraisals and offers have not been made, the con-
demnation is subject to inverse condemnation action or dis-
missal. 19 4 However, if additional protection is desired, the
legislature could ensure compliance with section 7267.2 by
requiring that the condemning agency state in the complaint
that they have made the offer under section 7267.2, or that
it is an emergency project and the agency will comply with
section 7267.2 within a reasonable time, but in no event later
than perhaps 30 days.
Under this recommendation, the deletion of section
1245.230(c)(4) also would be necessary. 19 5  Section
1245.230(c)(4) requires the agency to state in the resolution
of necessity that offers required by section 7267.2 have been
made, or that the owner could not be found.'9 6 Section
1245.230(c)(4) would no longer be necessary if resolutions
could be passed before appraisals and offers. The remaining
portions of 1245.230 should be left intact. The remaining
portions of section 1245.230 state the requirements for the
resolution of necessity. The resolution must state that the
governing body has authority to exercise the power of emi-
nent domain, that the property is for an intended public use,
that the property is necessary for the project, and that the
project is compatible with the greatest public benefit and the
least private injury.197
194. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 7267.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990) (provides for ap.
praisal prior to negotiations and sets forth the requirement that an offer be made
together with a written explanation of how the agency arrived at the value being
offered); San Jose v. Great Oaks Water, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 237 Cal. Rptr.
845 (1987) (the city did not comply with the provision that a written summary of
value must be provided. The court stated that the trial court did not err in
finding the city failed to comply with this provision by not providing a written
summary of the basis for its determination of the value of the property and
affirmed the trial court's decision granting Great Oaks' motion for summary
judgment).
195. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.230(c)(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990)
("that either the offer required by section 7267.2 of the Government Code has
been made to the owner or owners of record, or the offer has not been made
because the owner cannot be located with reasonable diligence.").
196. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.230(c)(4) (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
197. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.230 (West 1982 & Supp. 1 1990).
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3. Until these changes are made, acquiring agencies must
separate the 1245.235 hearing from the provision for passing
the resolution of necessity, and hold the hearing earlier for
all of the property owners. This would require that the ac-
quiring agency send personal notices to the property owners
announcing the hearing. Section 1245.235(d) permits the
hearing to be held with other hearings where use, need and
benefit-injury considerations can be heard. The Legislative
Committee Comment-Senate 1975 Addition suggests combin-
ing the hearing with those on relocation assistance and envi-
ronmental assessment.'98 The final design phase in highway
projects might be a better time for the 1245.235 hearing, but
in any event the hearing should be held before the
alignment is fixed and the governing body no longer has
discretion to consider greatest public benefit and least private
injury.
4. Finally, with the considered determination of the
greatest public benefit and least private injury more effective-
ly placed early in the process, the acquiring agency should be
198. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.235(d) (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990) ("not-
withstanding subdivision (b), the governing body may satisfy the requirements of
this section through any other procedure that has given each person described in
subdivision (a) reasonable written personal notice and a reasonable opportunity to
appear and be heard on the matters referred to in Section 1240.030."). Some ac-
quiring agencies do not have final design until after the environmental assessment
is approved, and might hesitate to notify owners of an intent to pass a resolution
of necessity until it is certain their property will be acquired. However, if the
plans are complete enough for the agency to establish how much the environment
will be impacted by the project in compliance with California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA), the agency should be able to determine the owners who
might be affected by the project. The notice requirements state only that a gener-
al description of the property is necessary. Alternatively, such a public hearing
may be very effective during the final design process, if the agency prefers. This
will give the public more input into the process, and facilitate negotiations later;
the affected owners will feel like they had some say in the project and could
result in the feeling that they bought into and assisted the location and benefit to
the community in the planning stage. At the same time notice and opportunity to
be heard required by the statutes is provided. The notice sent under section
1245.235(b) must provide that it is the intent of the governing body to pass the
resolution of necessity (to condemn) if the owners' property is necessary to build
the project and negotiations fail. This will furiher establish the necessity of the
property owner to negotiate reasonably with the governing agency, and avoid
hold-out tactics. See generally POLICY MANUAL, supra note 27, at 7; POLICY MANU-
AL, supra note 27, § 105.020 at 105-2 (final design after environmental assessment
approved, schedule 1245.235 hearings only if necessary to adopt resolution of
necessity; hearings held at same time as resolution adopted, if negotiations fail).
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granted possession immediately upon the court entering the
order for possession under 1255.410,199 and that the auto-
matic 30 day wait currently allowed for requesting a stay for
substantial hardship should be eliminated from section
1255.420.00 Section 1255.420 should be revised to read
that an owner can request a stay of the order of possession
for substantial hardship if a meritorious claim is presented at
the ex parte hearing at which the order is entered.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent revisions to the California eminent domain
statutes have failed to achieve what the Legislature intended.
The 1982 revision to Section 7267.2, requiring that appraisals
and offers be made prior to adopting a resolution of necessi-
ty, and the 1975 addition to section 1255.420, automatically
extending 30 days to all owners to prove substantial hardship
(even if the remaining question is only the amount of just
compensation to be paid) should be revised again.
The resolution of necessity states that the governing
body has made a determination of public use, of need for
the property, and of compatibility of public benefit and least
private injury. The resolution of necessity declares that a con-
sidered determination has been made after the property
owners affected by the project have had an opportunity to
be heard. This determination should be made before nego-
tiations begin and before appraisals and offers to purchase
are made. The hearing and determinations stated in the reso-
lution of necessity need to occur early enough in the con-
demnation process that the governing body does in fact still
have discretion to weigh the pros and cons of the acquisi-
tion. After the appraisals and offers are made, it is too late
to make a determination of greatest public benefit and least
private injury because, at this point, the governing body's
decision is often merely a rubber stamp, since irrevocable
commitments and investments have already been made. The
1982 revision to Section 7267.2, requiring resolutions after
appraisals and offers, should be repealed.
199. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.410 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990).
200. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.420 (West 1982) (this provision was added
in 1975, and gives property owners 30 days after the order for possession has
been entered to request stay of the order for substantial hardship reasons).
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As the court pointed out in Slauson,21' there are very
few cases in this area due to the difficulty of challenging the
resolution of necessity once it has been passed. The property
owner is in a much better position if he is able to raise his
concern with private injury early, while the project can still
accommodate his interest. The California Legislature should
encourage, not discourage, early determination of benefit
and injury.
Moreover, considered determinations of greatest public
benefit and least private injury early in the process make the
automatic 30 days allowed by section 1255.420212 for sub-
stantial hardship claims less necessary. If the property owner
has a meritorious claim of substantial hardship, the order for
possession should be stayed upon request at the ex parte
hearing when the order is entered.0 3
If the only question remaining is the amount of just
compensation to be paid, the 30 days serves no purpose. Sec-
tion 1255.420 should be revised to provide for a stay of the
order for possession upon request.
Legislative intent of balancing public benefit and needs
with private interests and injury have not been served by
these two revisions. Repeal of the 1982 revision to 7267 and
the automatic 30 day hardship provision of 1255.420 will
serve more effectively the legislative intent to achieve the
greatest public benefit and the least public injury, to mini-
mize acquisition time, to decrease condemnation blight, to
provide property owners with an opportunity to be heard on
the benefit-injury determination, to encourage parties to ne-
gotiate and settle acquisition matters, to institute uniform
practices, and to promote confidence in public programs.
Brenda K. Ross
201. 173 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 1126, 219 Cal. Rptr. 365, 368 (1985).
202. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.420 (West 1982).
203. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1255.410 (West 1982 & Supp. I 1990).
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